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A key task of cybersecurity is to discover and explain malicious behaviors of
malware. The understanding of malicious behaviors helps us further develop good
features and apply machine learning techniques to detect various attacks. The ef-
fectiveness of machine learning techniques primarily depends on the manual feature
engineering process, based on human knowledge and intuition. However, given the
adversaries’ efforts to evade detection and the growing volume of publications on
malicious behaviors, the feature engineering process likely draws from a fraction of
the relevant knowledge. Therefore, it is necessary and important to design an auto-
mated system to engineer features for discovering malicious behaviors and detecting
attacks.
First, we describe a knowledge-based feature engineering technique for mal-
ware detection. It mines documents written in natural language (e.g. scientific
literature), and represents and queries the knowledge about malware in a way that
mirrors the human feature engineering process. We implement the idea in a system
called FeatureSmith, which generates a feature set for detecting Android malware.
We train a classifier using these features on a large data set of benign and malicious
apps. This classifier achieves comparable performance to a state-of-the-art Android
malware detector that relies on manually engineered features. In addition, Feature-
Smith is able to suggest informative features that are absent from the manually
engineered set and to link the features generated to abstract concepts that describe
malware behaviors.
Second, we propose a data-driven feature engineering technique called Reason-
Smith, which explains machine learning models by ranking features based on their
global importance. Instead of interpreting how neural networks make decisions for
one specific sample, ReasonSmith captures general importance in terms of the whole
data set. In addition, ReasonSmith allows us to efficiently identify data biases and
artifacts, by comparing feature rankings over time. We further summarize the com-
mon data biases and artifacts for malware detection problems at the level of API
calls.
Third, we study malware detection from a global view, and explore automatic
feature engineering problem in analyzing campaigns that include a series of actions.
We implement a system ChainSmith to bridge large-scale field measurement and
manual campaign report by extracting and categorizing IOCs (indicators of com-
promise) from security blogs. The semantic roles of IOCs allow us to link qualitative
data (e.g. security blogs) to quantitative measurements, which brings new insights
to malware campaigns. In particular, we study the effectiveness of different per-
suasion techniques used on enticing user to download the payloads. We find that
the campaign usually starts from social engineering and “missing codec” ruse is a
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In recent years, machine learning is widely used in detecting malware be-
cause it learns common patterns from known malware automatically. The key of
machine learning is feature engineering, which is a process of using domain knowl-
edge to create features. The feature set allows researchers to represent samples in a
machine-readable way, which facilitates the detection and analysis by using machine
learning techniques. For example, the earliest Android malware families exhibited
simple malicious behaviors [1] and could often be identified based on the observa-
tion that they requested the permissions essential to their operation [2]. To engineer
such features, researchers reason about the properties that attacks are likely to have
in common. This amounts to generating hypotheses about attack behavior. While
such hypotheses can be tested using statistical techniques, they must be initially for-
mulated by human researchers. The best sources to collect the feature hypotheses
is scientific literature. Different from security blogs and industry reports, scientific
literature is carefully reviewed by researchers and the conclusions are more represen-
tative. However, due to security arms race, malware has increasingly adopted more
evasive techniques, and in response the security community has proposed a variety
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of new features to detect these behaviors. For example, Google Scholar estimates
that 32,300 papers have been published on Android malware and over 969,000 on
intrusion detection.Moreover, the volume of scientific publications is growing at an
exponential rate [3], as shown in Figure 1.1.
In addition, the feature engineering process is crucial to the effectiveness and
applicability of machine learning. This process is laborious and requires researchers
to assimilate a growing body of knowledge. For example, for a recent effort to
model the Manhattan traffic flows and predict the effectiveness of ride sharing [4],
data scientists from New York University invested 30 person-months in identifying
and incorporating informative features [5]. Because good machine learning mod-
els require a substantial manual effort, labor market estimates project a deficit of
190,000 data scientists by 2018 [6]. In the context of Android malware detection,
the Drebin [7] feature set consists of 8 types of features; one type encompasses
suspicious API calls. To engineer concrete features of this type, Drebin’s design-
ers manually identified 315 suspicious API calls from five categories: data access,
network communication, SMS messages, external command execution, and obfusca-
tion. For comparison, the Android framework version (API level 19) utilized by the
Drebin authors exported over 20,000 APIs. Moreover, this number keeps growing
and exceeds 25,000 in the current version (API level 23). This illustrates a key chal-
lenge for the feature engineering process: identifying API calls that may be useful
to malware authors requires extensive domain knowledge and manual investigation.
So in this dissertation, we first ask the question (#1): Can we automatically
generate feature hypotheses from scientific literature?
2





































Figure 1.1: Paper estimation from Google Scholar.
Since researchers cannot discuss every aspects of security, the feature hypothe-
ses from scientific literature may not be sufficient. An alternative solution to en-
gineer features is directly using machine learning to learn useful features, because
machine learning algorithm is able to test arbitrary feature hypotheses from data.
However, due to the black-box nature of machine learning, we cannot examine which
features are considered important for the model, and consequently, the model is
likely to learn data biases and artifacts. For example, the synthetic data utilized
in the DARPA IDS evaluation [8] was criticized for the lack of information on the
validation of test data [9]—such as measures of similarity with the traffic traces or
a rationale for concluding that similar behaviors should be expected when exposing
the systems-under-test to real world data. Mahoney et al. shows that the intru-
sion can be detected simply from TTL field, because attack traffic and background
traffic are generated from different physical machines and only a few values of TTL
present in the data [10,11]. Biases and artifacts from data sampling and generation
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process would be reflected in the quality of the machine-learning techniques trained
with this data. Unfortunately, in security it is generally difficult to obtain a clean
training set for ML-based detectors.
In addition, in order to achieve good performance, deep neural network is used
in detecting malware, e.g. multi-layer perceptron [12,13], CNN [14,15], RNN [16,17],
etc.. The complexity and flexibility of neural network architecture makes the model
powerful to fit the data and captures the common pattern of the attacks, but at
the same time, makes the explanation much more difficult than traditional machine
learning systems like logistic regression and decision tree. To address this problem,
people propose different systems to explain machine learning models [18–20]. How-
ever, most of the methods are only able to explain single instances, and therefore it
is still unknown if the explained sample and its explanation is representative. Given
the black-box nature of machine learning and the presence of data artifacts and bi-
ases, we ask the question (#2): Can we identify important features and data
artifacts from neural network models?
The features of malware detection are usually the observations from static or
dynamic analysis, and the behaviors are monitored from a single machine. How-
ever, from a global view, malware relies on a chain of actions to be delivered to
victims, which is called malware campaigns. It is difficult to systematically collect
measurement that captures a complete chain of campaign actions, because cam-
paigns involve the interactions between different hosts and are only active in a
certain time. Therefore, researchers come up with the idea of threat intelligence
to share the technical details of breaches and attacks. It makes everybody safer
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by making it harder for attackers to reuse attack methods and artifacts, thus in-
creasing their work factor [21]. Threat intelligence is a billion-dollar industry [22]
and has introduced standards [23–25], and information-sharing platforms [26–29].
These standards define threats using indicators of compromise (IOCs). For example,
to represent recent measurements of malware delivery networks [30–33] using these
standards, we can identify IOCs such as file hashes of malware droppers and of their
payloads, URLs and IP addresses of command-and-control (C&C) servers, or names
of malware families and exploit kits. However, individual IOCs do not allow us to
distinguish between components used for these various stages. Understanding the
sequential actions of malicious campaigns requires careful manual analysis, and the
results of this analysis are seldom encoded in a machine-readable format. Unfortu-
nately, these results are often published, either in practitioner-oriented journals such
as Virus Bulletin, or on the blogs of analysts or security companies, such as Webroot
or Trend Micro. On the other hand, field-measurements capture the global trend of
different attacks, where we can estimate the attack influence and victim volumes in
the real world. By linking qualitative data like security blogs to field-measurements,
we are able to learn both detailed behaviors from campaign operators and the global
influence from the campaign. Therefore, in this dissertation, we ask the question
(#3): Can we identify and categorize campaign indicators (i.e. IOCs)
from security reports?
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1.2 Challenges and contributions
1.2.1 Can we automatically generate feature hypotheses from scien-
tific literature?
Researchers engineer features for malware detection by reasoning about the
properties that malware samples are likely to have in common (e.g. they engage in
SMS fraud) and the concrete features that reflect these behaviors (e.g. the samples
request the SEND_SMS permission). These features may not single out the malicious
apps; for example, the SMS sending code is typically invoked from an onClick()
method [1], but this method is prevalent across all Android apps. Feature selection
methods can rank a list of potential features according their effectiveness (e.g. by
using mutual information [34]). However, the initial list is the result of a feature
engineering process, involving human researchers who rely on their intuition and
knowledge of the domain.
Additionally, machine learning techniques can be difficult to deploy in opera-
tional security systems, as the trained models detect malware samples but do not
outline the reasoning behind these inferences. In consequence, there is a semantic
gap between the model’s predictions and their operational interpretation [35]. For
example, a machine learning model that successfully separates malicious and be-
nign apps on a testing corpus by relying primarily on the onClick() feature would
be useless for detecting malware in the real world. Recent work on explaining the
outputs of classifiers generally focuses on providing utility measures (e.g. mutual
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information) for the features used in the model [7, 19]; however, classifiers trained
for malware detection typically use a large number of low level features [7], which
may not have clear semantic interpretations. To understand what these malware
detectors do, and to gain confidence in their outputs, the human analysts who use
them operationally require explanations that link the outputs of the malware detec-
tor with concepts that the analysts associate with malware behavior—a cognitive
process known as semantic priming [36]. Such explanations should convey the puta-
tive malicious behaviors, rather than the basic functionality described in developer
documents. For example, sendTextMessage should be relevant to not only “send
SMS message” but also “subscribe premium-rate service”; RECORD_AUDIO could be
related to “record audio” as well as “record phone call”.
Challenges. Natural language often contains ambiguities that cannot be resolved
without a deep understanding of the subject under discussion. For example, the
phrase “sends SMS message “798657” to multiple premium-rate numbers in Rus-
sia” [1] implies a malicious behavior to a human reader, but this inference is not
based on purely linguistic clues. In another example, the phrase “API calls for
accessing sensitive data, such as getDeviceId() and getSubscriberId()” [7] men-
tions concrete Android features, but inferring that these features would be useful
for malware detection requires understanding that Android malware is often inter-
ested in accessing sensitive data. To perform such commonsense reasoning, natural
language processing (NLP) techniques match the text against an existing ontology,
which is a collection of categories (e.g. malware samples, SMS messages), instances
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of these categories (e.g. FakePlayer is a malware sample) and relations among
them (e.g. FakePlayer sends message ”798657”) [37]. To this end, specialized on-
tologies have been developed in other scientific domains, such as medicine [38]. Un-
fortunately, security ontologies are in an incipient stage. CAPEC [39], MAEC [40]
and OpenIOC [23] provide detailed languages for exchanging structured information
about attacks and malware, but they are not designed for being matched against
natural language text.
This reflects a deeper challenge for automatic feature engineering. Ontologies
are manually constructed and reflect the known attacks and malware behaviors ob-
served in the real world. In contrast, scientific research is open ended and focuses on
novel and theoretical attacks. Moreover, the malware behavior evolves continuously,
as adversaries aim to evade existing security mechanisms.
There are also technical challenges for applying existing NLP techniques to the
security literature. In other scientific fields, such as biomedical research, papers have
structured abstracts, often in the IMRAD format (Introduction, Methods, Results,
And Discussion). This has facilitated the use of NLP for mining the biomedical
literature [41–43]. In contrast, the titles and abstracts of security papers are too
general to extract useful information for automatic feature engineering. While the
paper bodies contain the relevant information, they also include a large amount of
abstract concepts and terms that represent noise for the feature engineering system.
For example, a ten-page paper may mention a specific malware behavior in only one
sentence. In consequence, extracting concrete features from security papers requires
new text mining techniques.
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Goals. Our first goal is to design a general approach for discovering valuable fea-
tures mentioned in natural language documents about malware detection. These
features should be concrete named entities, such as Android API calls, permissions
and intents,1 that we can extract directly from a corpus of malware samples us-
ing off-the-shelf static analysis tools. Given a feature type, our approach should
discover useful feature instances automatically. This automatic feature engineer-
ing approach complements the traditional approach, where data scientists manually
create the feature sets based on their own domain knowledge. Specifically, while
the manual feature engineering process benefits from human creativity and deep
personal insights, the strength of our automatic technique is its ability to draw from
a larger body of knowledge, which is increasingly difficult for humans to assimilate
fully. Our second goal is to rank the extracted features according to how closely
they are related to malware behavior. Rather than simply extracting all the fea-
tures mentioned in the natural language documents, we aim to discover the ones
that are considered most informative in the literature. Our third goal is to provide
semantic explanations for the features discovered, by linking them to abstract con-
cepts discussed in the literature in relation to malware behavior. A meta-goal is to
implement and evaluate a real system for automatic feature engineering based on
these ideas; we select the problem of Android malware detection for this proof of
concept.
Contributions. In summary, we make the following contributions:
1Additional examples include blacklisted URLs, Windows registry keys, or fields from the head-
ers of network packets.
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• We propose a semantic network model for representing a growing body of
knowledge. This model addresses unique challenges for mining the security
literature.
• We propose techniques for synthesizing the knowledge contained in thousands
of natural language documents to generate concrete features that we can utilize
for training machine learning classifiers.
• We describe FeatureSmith, an automatic feature engineering system. Using
FeatureSmith, we generate a feature set for detecting Android malware. This
set includes informative features that a manual feature engineering process
may overlook, and its effectiveness rivals that of a state-of-the-art malware
detection system. FeatureSmith also helps us characterize the evolution of
knowledge about Android malware.
• We propose a mechanism that uses our semantic network to generate fea-
ture explanations, which link the features to concepts that describe malware
behaviors.
• For reproducibility, we release the automatically engineered feature set and
the semantic network used to generate it at http://featuresmith.org.
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1.2.2 Can we identify important features and data artifacts from
neural network models?
Machine learning especially deep learning is capable to learn complicated fea-
tures automatically from data, which seems overcome the difficulties from manual
feature engineering. However, due to the black-box nature of deep learning models,
we have no clues about what features the system has learned. As a result, we cannot
tell which features are important with respect to the training data and cannot dis-
tinguish if the model generalize security knowledge or merely memorize the training
instances.
For malware detection, biases and artifacts are common in the data set, and
can be originated from data generation process. For example, executing malware in
sandbox environment is widely used to collect data from dynamic analysis. However,
the virtual machine creates unique environment (e.g. network settings) that poten-
tially changes the malware behaviors. The malware attempts to scan the network
range can connect to internal gateway, which will never happen in the real world.
The standard machine learning validation methods like cross-validation cannot solve
this problem, because the artifacts will always exist in both training and testing sets.
As a result, the neural networks can easily memorize the data artifacts, but such
knowledge cannot be generalized to the area outside this environment. Therefore,
it is important to design a tool that can pinpoint the place where data artifacts are
likely to happen.
Research has been done to explain how the machine learning is making de-
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cisions, and approximate the decision in the form of feature weight [18, 19], which
helps human to verify if the decision is correct. However, such explanation can
only interpret the model locally, and it is still unclear what the model uses features
globally. Moreover, the problem cannot be solved by explaining more samples, since
it is difficult state that the selected samples are representative to the whole data
set. Neural networks are usually trained on millions of samples, however humans
are unlikely to verify the explanation of even a small proportion of samples.
An alternative solution is to generate explanation at the feature level, which is
widely used in traditional machine learning models. For example, logistic regression
can be used in classification problems. The model parameter directly indicates the
feature influence, which allows people to validate and adjust the model without
retrieving any samples from training set. Therefore a feature-oriented solution is
more efficient in examining the global model behaviors. Fortunately, input features
for malware detection usually have their own semantic meaning especially for the
observation at the level of API calls.
Challenges. The first challenge to reasoning deep neural network models based on
input features is finding a metric that captures the general feature importance. In
logistic regression model, since there is no hidden layer and no non-linear activation
functions except for the output layer, system weight directly reflects the general con-
tribution from each features. However, deep neural networks have multiple hidden
layers, non-linear activation functions and different network architectures. These
characteristics makes the model powerful to mine and memorize patterns from train-
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ing data, but on the other hand, makes the relationship between input features and
the output complicated. Therefore, it is almost impossible to derive a formula that
explicitly calculates feature influence from model weights.
To overcome this, we model the global feature influence as a random variable
that is dependent on the input feature, and the input feature is another random
variable. If the feature influence is small with high probability, then we can conclude
that the model does not consider this feature important. Therefore we can identify
a feature set that are not used by the model.
The second challenge is how to define feature influence and how to estimate
the distribution. To overcome this challenge, we define feature influence using the
gradient of output with respect to the input. The gradient indicates the directions
of input if we need to change output, and the magnitude of it reflects the feature
importance locally. Similar idea has been applied in both model visualization [20]
and adversarial machine learning [44, 45]. Instead of directly estimating the distri-
bution, we characterizes the random variable using mean and covariance, which can
be efficiently estimated empirically using maximum likelihood estimation.
Goals. The first goal is to design a system that is able to measure the influence
of all features for a deep neural network model. The feature influence reflects the
usage of each feature globally, such that by removing features with low influence,
the negative affect should be minimum. In addition, the reasoning system should
be compatible with different network architectures and cannot affect or change the
model to be explained. Our second goal is to apply the proposed model to malware
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detection problems and identify biases and artifacts that learned by the malware
detector.
Contributions. In summary, we make following contributions.
• We propose a method called ReasonSmith to rank features based on their
global importance. Compared to the traditional metrics like mutual infor-
mation, ReasonSmith assigns better importance score to features for machine
learning model. By removing less importance features, the machine learning
model is still able to achieve high true positive rate with a low false positive
rate.
• We propose a method to generate hypotheses on data biases and artifacts
using ReasonSmith results and data sets in different time.
• We conduct an empirical study on both Windows and Android data sets, and
find new features that are absent from prior knowledge and identify common
data artifacts.
1.2.3 Can we identify and categorize campaign indicators from secu-
rity reports?
A malware delivery campaign [30, 33, 46–48] involves multiple steps: baiting
the user to perform a risky action, such as opening an email attachment or visiting
an unknown site; exploiting an unpatched vulnerability on the user’s computer;
and installing a dropper [30], which then downloads additional malware. If one
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step fails, the malware delivery fails; for example, an exploit kit [49] is useless
unless the attacker can lure users to the landing page. The technical challenges
for implementing each of these steps make it difficult for an individual actor to
execute a campaign from end to end. Instead, malware creators rely on a thriving
underground economy [31, 32, 49, 50], where specialized services are provided for a
fee and one can quickly set up a campaign by summoning the hacking expertise of
third parties.
In this ecosystem, we call the actors that provide malware-delivery services
suppliers and the actors that utilize the service customers. Understanding the
business relationships among suppliers and their customers can uncover important
dependencies among these actors and may guide effective interventions [51]. For
example, we distinguish between tier 1 suppliers, which are directly involved in
user baiting and exploitation, and other suppliers that act as middlemen. Because
only tier 1 suppliers bring victims to the delivery network, the effectiveness of their
techniques is critical for the entire ecosystem.
However, neither threat intelligence nor measurement studies can provide a
complete picture of malware delivery campaigns. Threat intelligence reports analyze
the strategies employed in a campaign, but do not assess the effectiveness of these
strategies in a systematic manner. For example, the reports may discuss a tier-1
supplier’s baiting methods (e.g. spam, malvertising, compromised sites) but do not
quantify the volume of malware downloads that these methods produce in the wild,
as this would require comprehensive field data. Field measurements can record
download events systematically, and provide various IOCs, but they may not be
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able to indicate the role of them. For example, the measurement data does not
usually indicate whether a dropper corresponds to a tier 1 supplier, nor does it
indicate how the dropper was installed on the host. Moreover, measurement studies
often focus on a single phase of the campaign—e.g., baiting [52,53], exploitation [54,
55], or installation [30, 33]—and do not shed light on the strategies of long-lasting
campaigns. These insights require the ability to connect the threat intelligence with
the field measurements.
Challenges. The key challenges to automating the insight generation process are
the semantics of security threats in a machine-readable format, extracting them
from the available threat intelligence, and developing analytics that combine the
threat intelligence with measurement data. Existing standards for sharing threat
intelligence like OpenIOC [23] and STIX [25] are incomplete and do not capture
important concepts, such as the persuasion strategy employed by attackers to con-
vince users into running malware or to lure them to an exploit kit. Worse, the
IOC feeds currently available omit critical information, even when this informa-
tion can be represented in the current standards. For example, STIX specifies the
kill_chain_phase IOC attribute, which indicates the role of the indicator in the
campaign; however, current feeds omit this attribute. Instead, this information is
usually provided in the threat intelligence reports in natural language. However,
prior work on mining security articles [56, 57] does not extract the roles of IOCs in
campaigns, and does not correlate the information extracted from natural language
with field measurement data.
16
To overcome these challenges, we aim to extract the threat and campaign
semantics from intelligence reports written in colloquial English. In doing so, we
further identify three technical challenges that are specific to security discourses.
First, natural language processing (NLP) techniques usually rely on the context of
complete sentences. However in security articles IOCs are often included in bulleted
lists and tables, while the relevant relations are discussed in the text. Second, some
indicators are presented in an obfuscated form. For example, to prevent the mis-
clicking of a malicious site, malicious links are transformed to use “hxxp” instead
of “http”, and “[dot]” or (dot)” instead of “.”, and authors use different names
and delimiters for malware families. Third, the security arms race gives rise to
a growing number of technical terms [56], while language models cannot usually
handle previously unseen words.
Goals. Our first goal is to build a generic system that mines descriptions of security
threats written in natural language, and extracts threat intelligence in a format that
enables correlations and complements measurement data. Specifically, we aim to
extract both IOCs and their roles in an attack, which allows us to augment the
measurement data with the semantics of security threats observed. To this end,
we develop new NLP techniques that address technical challenges specific to the
security domain.
Our second goal is to apply our system to the concrete problem of understand-
ing malware delivery campaigns and to gain new insights into this security threat.
To this end, we propose a model of malware delivery campaigns (detailed in Sec-
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tion 5.1.1), and we build a Web application for manually labeling articles according
to this model. We also correlate the threat intelligence with a comprehensive data
set of download events [30], observed on 5M hosts. With this combined data set,
we ask the following research questions:
1. What is the relative effectiveness of various persuasion techniques in generating
downloads on real-world hosts?
2. What roles do various attack groups play in the malware delivery ecosystem,
and what are the business relationships among them?
3. How long do malware delivery campaigns remain active?
4. How long do their support infrastructures remain active?
In addition to our findings and their actionable implications, we expect that
the process of answering these research questions will provide important lessons
about the utility of threat intelligence—both for the tasks it was originally meant
to address and for the novel application proposed in this paper. This is our third
and final goal.
Contributions. In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We design ChainSmith, an IOC extraction system that collects indicators from
security articles and classifies them into different campaign stages.
• We evaluate the effect of different persuasion techniques on the subsequent
payload delivery in the wild, by connecting campaigns from blog posts and
the real-world telemetry data.
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• We report new findings about the underground business relationship and the
characteristics of campaign infrastructures. This allows us to assess the utility
of threat intelligence.
• We set up a Web application (http://ioc-chainsmith.org) to release the
latest data from ChainSmith to further stimulate the research on threat intel-
ligence.
1.3 Assumptions and limitations
Behaviors with complex operations. Since the features discussed in scientific
literature are likely to be semantically meaningful, we focus on concrete features,
which do not impose additional manual effort for the data collection. We are not
able to extract behaviors that encode more complex operations, such as specific
conditions or behavior sequences [58]. For example, from the sentence “send SMS
without notification,” we extract two behaviors—“send SMS” and “send without
notification”—rather than a single behavior with a conditional dependence. In ad-
dition, owing to limitations in the state of the art techniques for natural language
processing, we expect that some of the features we extract will not be useful (e.g.,
when they result from parsing errors); however, our highest ranked features should
be meaningful and informative.
White-box assumption. For data-driven feature engineering approach, we must
have complete access to the neural network models in order to calculate gradient
for importance estimation. The primary usage of the reasoning tool is finding data
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biases and artifacts during training. Consequently, we expect people who train the
model to use this tool for examining and debugging the model, rather than peo-
ple from third-party who do not have permissions to access internal structure of
the model. In addition, since the proposed system identifies the key knowledge
extracted from the model, which might be sensitive and crucial, the white-box as-
sumption helps to protect data privacy and business secretes. Instead, we discuss
techniques for bridging the semantic gap between the outputs of malware classi-
fiers and the operational interpretation of these outputs, in order to allow security
researchers and analysts to benefit from the entire body of published research. Al-
though ReasonSmith system requires access to the original model, it is compatible
to any architecture of neural networks and does not affect its training process. In
this dissertation, we only test the case for multi-layer perceptron, but it can be
applied to other models, which is discussed in Chapter 6.
Gaussian distributed interpretation. To model the global interpretation for
neural network models, We use Gaussian distribution to estimate the local inter-
pretation for a single instance. However, the Gaussian distribution is a strong
assumption. The benefit of this assumption is computational complexity, and we
are able to obtain a less precise but faster evaluation for the model and the data.
Additionally, we discuss a more precise estimation method without the Gaussian
assumption in Chapter 6.
Human examination for data artifacts. Since machine learning model cannot
learn the semantic meaning of features, model cannot tell if the features come from
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data artifacts. Distinguishing if a feature reflects the core malware behavior or the
data artifact requires human intervention and the process is based on the under-
standing of malware behaviors. We aim to provide a method to efficiently prioritize
the features for manual examination, but we cannot completely replace this step.
Additionally, we do not aim to enumerate all biases and artifacts from data. Our
system is able to identify the most important features learned by the model, which
provides an opportunity to verify if there are any biases and artifacts learned. How-
ever, even though biases and artifacts are common in training data, model may not
consider them important.
Noise from qualitative data. In this dissertation, we use scientific literature and
industry reports to generate feature hypotheses and use security blogs to extract
concrete indicators for malware campaigns. However, we are unable to assess the
quality of the information discussed in these articles. Although it is likely that these
sources contains fake information, we use the information to generate hypotheses
and further test the hypotheses using measurement data. For example, the features
engineered from scientific literature are further tested on malware data set using
machine learning algorithm, and the malware campaign indicators from security
blogs can also be found from measurement data. Therefore, quantitative sources
provide external validation for the information extracted from qualitative sources.
Performance of malware detector. We aim to engineer informative features for
detecting malware in general from both qualitative sources (i.e. scientific literature
and security blogs) and quantitative sources (i.e. malware behavior measurements),
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so we do not aim to outperform existing malware detection systems on a specific data
set in terms of precision and recall. In addition, since it is unlikely to obtain a precise
time stamp for all the information collected from qualitative sources, it is difficult to
compare two feature set (i.e. automatic feature set from FeatureSmith and manual
engineered set) with exactly the same time span. However, our system is able to
engineer features automatically and can efficiently update the security knowledge by
adding new articles and get rid of the intensive manual effort to engineer features.
1.4 Overview of natural language processing
In this chapter, we briefly introduce the state-of-the-art natural language pro-
cessing techniques, which will be used in the automatic feature engineering systems.
1.4.1 Syntactic parsing
Syntactic parsing performs tokenization, part-of-speech tagging and depen-
dency parsing, which processes the raw string to a tree structure that indicates
the word dependency. This stage is equivalent to the lexical analysis and syntac-
tic analysis in a compiler. Dependency parsing represents sentences as a directed
graph to express the relationship between words. The parser identifies the gram-
matical relationship between words and labels each relationship with a type. For
example, Figure 1.2 shows one example of dependency tree, where the arc label is
the dependency type [59]. From the typed dependencies, we know that the MD5
“4462c5b3556c5cab5d90955b3faa19a8” is the object of “drop”, while the subject
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Figure 1.2: Example of dependency parsing.
of “drop” is “campaign”. Therefore, we learn that the given hash depends on “drop”
instead of “on”, even though they are equally close to the hash. Syntactic parsing
is widely used in NLP applications and the state-of-the-art system has a reasonable
experimental performance.
Most of the NLP tools perform syntactic parsing. In this work, we use Python
NLTK [60] for sentence and word tokenization and Stanford CoreNLP [61] for de-
pendency parsing.
1.4.2 Semantic parsing
Since syntactic parsing cannot tell the semantic similarity among words, to
make the system more generic, we have to understand the meaning of words. The
state-of-the-art technique for semantic parsing is word embedding, which represents
words, with close semantic meaning, in a close position in the vector space. The
most popular embedding method is word2vec [62, 63], which trains word vectors
by maximizing the probability of a word given its adjacent words. For example,
in Figure 1.2, “campaign” and the MD5 are considered as the context of “drop”,
and the system should maximize the probability of “drop” given its context words.
Instead of using adjacent words as the context, dependency-based word embedding
utilizes word dependency to train word vector [64]. For example, for the MD5 in
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Figure 1.2, the context is drop:dobj rather than {“drop”, “on”}. The benefit of
dependency-based word2vec is that it learns functional similarity rather than topical
similarity. In addition, the embedding of dependency can be trained using related
words, which indicates the common context pattern of a word.
1.4.3 Named entity recognition
Named entity recognition (NER) locates and classifies named entities into
pre-defined categories. There is no general technique that is applicable to all NER
problems, because the entity categories or ontology is usually task-dependent. Most
of the NLP research focuses on identifying the names of persons, locations and
organizations. While in security, the categories may include URLs, IP addresses, file
names, etc.. Although there is no standard method for NER problems, the solution
usually includes: fixed dictionary, regular expression or machine learning based
classifier. Since most security entities (e.g. URLs, and IP addresses) tend to follow
fixed patterns, regular expression is necessary to select entity candidates and remove
irrelevant words. Table 1.1 lists the rules and additional constraints of recognizing
the most common entity types in security. We should also take into account certain
writing practices common to security articles that do not follow general patterns.
For example, to prevent the mis-clicking of malicious site, some bloggers use “hxxp”
instead of “http”, and “[dot]” or (dot)” instead of “.”. Additionally, authors might
use different delimiters for malware family names, e.g. replacing underscores with
semicolons, so we accept the delimiter to be any one of underscore, slash, period,
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Table 1.1: Rules of named entity recognition.
Type Rules
URL Identified top level domain must be found [65].
IPv4 Contains 4 digits (<256) and the address is not reserved [66].
hash A hexadecimal string of length 32, 40 or 64.
family Starts with malware types, and contains common delimiter [67].
EK Either in defined dictionary [68] or ends with EK or exploit kit.
vuln. CVE-[0-9]{4}-[0-9]{4,5}
colon, and semicolon.
Because security narratives often include multi-word expressions, we cannot
simply analyze individual words. For example, Black Hole is the name of an exploit
kit; in this context, the words Black and Hole are meaningless when considered
separately. Mikolov et al. propose a simple unsupervised approach to identify multi-
word expressions [63]. The intuition behind this method is that the joint probability
of words is much higher than the product of the probability of individual words for
multi-word expression. In the example of “Black Hole”, since the word “Black” is




The paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review the related work. In
Chapter 3, we introduce a knowledge-based feature engineering system that mines
features for malware detection from natural-language sources. In Chapter 4, we
introduce a data-driven feature engineering approach that ranks features based on
their global importance. In Chapter 5, we study automatic feature engineering
problem for malware delivery campaign.
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Chapter 2: Related Work
2.1 Knowledge-based feature engineering
Research on mining scientific literature dates back to Swanson [69], who hy-
pothesized that fish oil could be used as a treatment for Raynaud’s disease by
observing that both had been linked to blood viscosity in disjoint sets of papers.
Building on this observation, Swanson et al. [70] designed the Arrowsmith system
for finding such missing links from biomedical articles. To reduce false positives,
the system relies on a long list of stopwords and can only process the paper ab-
stracts. Follow-on work proposed additional techniques, e.g. clustering [41] and
latent semantic indexing (LSI) [42], but still focuses on either abstracts or titles.
More recently, Spangler et al. mine paper abstracts and suggest kinases that are
likely to phosphorylate the protein p53, by using all the single words and bigrams
as the features but without checking whether all the features are meaningful [43].
In contrast to these approaches, we mine document bodies, we propose rules for
extracting multi-word malware behaviors and we link these behaviors to concrete
Android features.
Semantic networks are based on cognitive psychology research [36] that ob-
served that concepts that are mentioned together in natural language are more likely
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to be related, which provides a mechanism for estimating the semantic similarity
of two concepts. IBM Watson utilized a semantic network for answering Jeopardy!
questions from the “common bonds” and “missing links” categories [71]. Two ques-
tions are solved by searching for the entities that are close on the semantic network
to the entities provided in the question. Our approach differs from the previous work
on semantic networks in two aspects. The nodes in our semantic graph are behav-
iors (verb phrases instead of single words or noun phrases), as these behaviors are
more meaningful for capturing the malicious actions. Another difference is that our
semantic network is a tripartite graph, which mirrors the malware-behavior-feature
reasoning process and which reduces the computation time.
Few references in security utilize natural language processing in system design.
Neuhaus et al. analyze the trend of vulnerability by applying LDA to vulnerability
description [72]. Pandita et al. identify Android permissions that are implicitly
stated in the app description by using a dependency parser and first order logic [73].
Zhu et al. propose a framework to represent the knowledge available in security
literature and generate features for detecting malware [56]. Liao and Yuan et al.
propose a system to automatically extract OpenIOC items from blog posts [57].
Sun et al. design a system to generate human-friendly report for the results from
Cuckoo sandbox [74]. Panwar designs a framework to generate IOCs in STIX format
from Cuckoo sandbox results [75]. Zhu et al. propose a system to identify and
categorize IOCs from blog posts, and show a use case of combining qualitative data
to quantitative measurements [76]. A concurrent work by Husari et al. convert the
Symantec malware report to STIX format by utilizing a pre-defined ontology [77].
28
In terms of the NLP techniques, we use word embedding instead of manually defined
rules to learn the semantics of sentences, which is more general and applicable to
a broader area. In addition, most of the work only focus on how to apply NLP to
security but do not show security implications behind it.
2.2 Data-driven feature engineering
Since it is difficult to engineer a good feature set for malware detection, people
tend to rely on the model to engineer features automatically from the data. How-
ever, due to the black-box nature of deep neural networks, researchers have limited
understanding about how the model is making decisions even if it achieves perfect
performance in testing. The absence of explanability makes the model vulnerable
to potential evasion and poisoning attacks. Therefore, a lot of work have been done
in recent years to interpret how models make decisions. The difficulty of generat-
ing explanation from model depends on the model complexity. For the traditional
machine learning models, like logistic regression, SVM, decision tree, the feature
importance can be derived either through rigorous statistical inference or from intu-
ition. For example, whether the parameter from regression model is non-zero can be
tested using t-test [78], which tells us if corresponding features are not significant.
In recent years, deep neural networks are widely used in malware detection,
because deep neural network is more flexible and can better fit the data. However,
the complexity of deep neural networks, on the other hand, makes it difficult to
interpret the detection results. Most of work on DNN explanation focus on iden-
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tifying the most important features used by model for a specific sample. Ribeiro
et al. propose LIME to explain the model locally by training a separate explana-
tion regression model [19]. A new data set is generated around the sample to be
explained using the trained model, which is then used to train a logistic regression
model. The feature importance can be derived directly from the weights of logis-
tic regression model. Guo et al. extend the idea of LIME and propose a system
LEMNA specific to security applications [18]. They add fused lasso to handle data
dependency from binary reverse engineering and mixed regression model to handle
non-linearity. Both solutions assume that the model is a black-box and we can only
infer the model from input-output relationships.
Without black-box solution, others try to obtain the explanation from gradi-
ent, which is also the basic of ReasonSmith technique. The key idea is that the
gradient of the output with respect to the input indicates the direction of input
in order to change output, which is an indicator of feature importance by itself.
Simonyan et al. first proposed the gradient solution to explain CNN image classi-
fiers [20]. They define the saliency map as the absolute value of output gradient.
Gan et al. proposed a spatial-temporal saliency map to event detection in video [79].
The gradient-guided techniques are widely adopted in adversarial machine learning
to efficiently create evasion samples [44, 45]. Instead of using gradient, Zhou et al.
proposed an class-specific saliency map that is derived from global average pooling
to explain object detectors [80].
Most of model interpretation work focuses on explaining a single instance.
However, explaining a few samples does not provide a strong evidence of the relia-
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bility of the model, because the sample may not be representative. In general, it is
hard to evaluate the general misbehaviors from the model. People have developed
several techniques to evaluate if the model generalizes the knowledge from data or
simply memorize it. Zhang et al. randomly change the labels and test the per-
formance drop of the model to see if the model actually memorizes the fake data.
Morcos et al. evaluate the robustness of model by testing the model reliance on
single directions [81]. They conclude that if the model is less reliance on single di-
rections, then the model is more likely to generalize knowledge from data. However,
both techniques can only be used to compare models and fail to develop a crite-
rion to determine if a model only memorizes the data. Pendlebury et al. proposed
a result-oriented strategy and developed some metrics to evaluate model and data
bias [82]. The key idea is that the performance of the model that is built on artifacts
will degrade in the future. However, this strategy requires the data in a long time
span. Our technique is feature-oriented, which models the feature influence as a
random variable. Different from image classifier where the individual features (pix-
els) are not meaningful, malware detector usually takes observations from static and
dynamic analysis as features, and each features have their own semantic meanings.
2.3 Malware detection
Android malware detection has been studied several years, Zhou et al. con-
ducted the first systematic analysis of Android malware behaviors, from the initial
infection to the malicious functionality [1]. As these behaviors often require specific
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Android permissions, Felt et al. [83] and then Au et al. [84] proposed static analysis
tools to analyze the Android permission specification.
Subsequently, considerable efforts have been devoted to detecting Android
malware, ranging from static and dynamic analysis [2,85] to machine learning tech-
niques [7,86,87]. Approaches based on static or dynamic analysis typically propose
heuristics or anomaly detection strategies for identifying malware. Zhou et al. first
apply permission-based filtering to filter out most of apps that are unlikely to be
malicious, and then generate behavioral footprints for from static and dynamic anal-
ysis [2]. Zhang et al. construct API dependency graphs for each app, and identify
the malware by detecting anomalies on these graphs [85].
Machine learning techniques typically model malware detection as a binary
classification problem. Peng et al. applied a Naive Bayes model to assess how
risky apps are given the permissions they request [86]. Aafer et al. used k -nearest
neighbors and extracted Android API calls as features [87]. Arp et al. built the
Drebin system, which utilizes features extracted from the manifest file and from
the bytecode (including permissions, intents, network addresses, API calls, etc.)
and trains an SVM classifier for malware detection [7]. In [12], Grosse et al. use
multi-layer perceptron to detect Android malware, and apply it to the same data
set as Drebin to study adversarial examples. In [16], Xu et al. use both multi-layer
perceptron and long short-term memory (LSTM) to detect Android malware, where
the former network is used for fast filtering and the latter network is to generate
more accurate result.
Different from Android system where API calls and permissions are semanti-
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cally meaningful by themselves, Windows API methods are only meaningful when
considering the arguments. For example, system information is stored in reg-
istry keys, and any attempts to edit the system configuration can be reflected
from registry keys and values. However, the API method to edit registry key (i.e.
RegSetValueExA or RegSetValueExW) only indicates the behavior, and cannot tell
if the program tries to edit sensitive configurations. To solve the missing semantic
problem, analysts manually create heuristics to label malware based on API calls and
their corresponding arguments. For example, Cuckoo sandbox is an open-source tool
to execute and analyze malware [88]. Cuckoo has a signature class that is manually
created to label malware. The signatures can be either general to all malware (for
example ...\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\... represents autostart), or specific
to one malware family (e.g. wmpsl64.exe is the payload name of Bublik trojan).
Signatures label and detect malware in a deterministic way, and its coverage
is generally smaller compared to machine learning systems. For Windows malware
detection problem, features are usually the event sequence from dynamic analysis,
where the event is the combination of API call and its arguments. Schultz et al. use
loaded DLLs, strings and byte sequences as features to detect Windows malware,
and compare the performance of different machine learning models including Ripper
(rule-based model) and Naive Bayesian [89]. To capture temporal information from
execution traces, Kolter et al. use n-gram instead of single API calls as features,
and further compared different detection models including Naive Bayesian, decision
tree, support vector machine (SVM), and boosted decision trees. [90]. Association
rules are also used in detecting malware. In [91], Ye et al. use API sequence as
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feature and Objective-Oriented Association mining as the model. In [92], Ravi et
al. use 4-gram from Windows API call sequence as features. In addition, researchers
develop different tools to learn the meaning of arguments. Pascanu et al. propose
a 2-stage architecture, where the former network is used to extract feature from
arguments (e.g. file names) and the latter network is used for detection [93]. Au-
thors further evaluate different architecture and conclude that Echo state networks
(ESNs) and logistic regression are the optimal architecture for extracting features
from argument and final detection decision respectively For the same problem, Athi-
waratkun evaluate other architecture options including character-level CNN, long
short-term memory (LSTM) and gated recurrent unit (GRU) [17]. Results show
that the LSTM with temporal max pooling and logistic regression achieves optimal
performance. Similarly, the system from Tobiyama et al. consists of two stages, but
they use RNN to extract features and CNN for detection. Instead of using features
from dynamic analysis, Saxe et al. propose using features from PE meta for malware
detection [94].
2.4 Malware campaign and threat intelligence
Most prior measurement studies focused on only one stage of malware deliv-
ery campaigns. Prior work has identified social media advertising [95–97], spam
email [98, 99], compromised site [53], or SEO poisoning [52] as techniques used for
delivering payloads. However, most of the work did not quantify the volume of
malware downloads resulting from these techniques. Nelms et al. [97] measure the
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influence of different persuasion techniques on malware downloads quantitatively
by parsing HTTP response and manually annotating the content. However, this
method is not scalable from both manual annotation and network monitoring. In
addition, this method fails if the package is encrypted using HTTPS. The advantage
of our technique is that there are less restrictions on measurement data, because the
campaign information is collected from independent sources.
Eshete et al. propose a system to detect if the URL is the landing page
of exploit kit based on the common techniques and behaviors of exploit kit. [54].
Moreover, Eshete et al. design a exploit kit infiltration toolkit to detect the exploited
vulnerabilities [55].
The malicious downloading behavior was analyzed by Kwon et al. in [30,33].
In [30], a classifier is designed to detect malware using downloader-payload relation-
ships. In [33], the authors propose a system to detect coordinated behaviors among
downloaders on multiple hosts. PUP delivery services were studied in [31,100]. The
former identifies the PUP publisher and the delivery service from the certificate
and structure of download relationships, while the latter closely investigates a few
prevalent PPI services and monitors the subsequent delivery behavior.
Zhang et al. propose a system to detect malicious servers and group them into
campaigns using HTTP traces from ISPs [101]. Plohmann et al. comprehensively
analyze domain generating algorithms and pre-compute the DGA domains in [102].
IOCs (indicators of compromise) are commonly used to model malware cam-
paigns. The IOCs specified in OpenIOC, STIX and CybOX standards [23–25] define
the role of an indicator in a campaign, for instance that an IP address corresponds
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to a C&C server. Researchers at Lockheed-Martin corporation proposed a cyber
kill chain model to describe the action sequence from attacker to launch malware
campaign [103]. STIX includes the cyber kill chain definition, however this is seldom
used in existing IOC feeds. For example, Hailataxii [29] is a repository for threat
intelligence data formatted according to the STIX standard. Although more than
700,000 indicators are provided by Hailataxii, none of them include the kill chain
phase, which can only be inferred manually from natural language description of
indicator.
In [57], Liao and Yuan et al. propose a system to automatically collect IOC
from blog posts in natural language. They model the problem as graph similarity
problem, and identify the IOC item if it has a similar graph structure as the training
set. However, the identified IOCs do not preserve their roles in a malicious campaign,
which makes it difficult to analyze the characteristics of campaign in different stages
and to correlate with field measurements. To address this problem, Zhu et al. and
Husari et al. propose two different approaches to further categorize and bring more
semantics to IOCs [76,77].
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Chapter 3: Knowledge-based feature engineering
In this chapter, we propose a system that automatically engineers features from
scientific literature for malware detection. In Chapter 3.1, we introduce semantic
network to represent security knowledge and engineer features from it. Then we
show how the semantic network is constructed for Android malware detection in
Chapter 3.2. We evaluate the performance of knowledge-based feature engineering
system in Chapter 3.3.
3.1 Semantic network
3.1.1 Definition
We model the concepts discussed in natural language using a semantic network,
defined as an undirected graph G = (V,E). The set of vertices V includes the
concepts extracted, and the set of edges E captures the pairwise relations between
the concepts. Each edge has a weight, which captures the semantic similarity of the
two concepts linked.
There are three types of nodes in the semantic network: threats Vt, behaviors
Vb, and features Vf . We define two types of edges: (1) links between threats and
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behaviors Etb = {{u, v},∀u ∈ Vt,∀v ∈ Vb}; and (2) links between behaviors and
features Efb = {{u, v}, ∀u ∈ Vb,∀v ∈ Vf}. An edge may not connect two nodes of
the same type. Nevertheless, two concepts from the same set may be semantically
related; for example, an API call might require certain permissions; and two mal-
ware families could have a shared module. We can establish these connections by
traversing one or more hops on the semantic network. This approach has the benefit
that the path between two concepts preserves the intermediate concepts (the API
call and the shared module, in our previous example), which helps the reasoning
process.
We create an edge if two nodes appear within N sentences for no less than M
times. In our experiments, we set N = 3 and M = 1. However, using a larger N
could on the contrary introduce more noise. M is another parameter to balance the
precision and recall. Because we aim to identify novel ideas, rather than common
sense, we choose a small M . Each edge is weighted by M . If two nodes appear
together frequently, then these two concepts are more likely to be related.
3.1.2 Behavior extraction
We extract suspicious behaviors discussed in the security literature in two
steps: (1) we identify phrases that may correspond to suspicious behaviors, and (2)
we apply filtering and weighting techniques to find the most relevant ones.
Behavior collection. We define a behavior as a tuple that consists of subject,
verb and object, where either subject or object could be missing. Single words or
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multi-word expressions are not sufficient to provide a semantic meaning without
ambiguity. For example, number could refer to phone number or random number
due to a missing modifier, and data could refer to steal data or inject data due to the
missing verb. Therefore, we define behavior as a basic primitive in our approach.
Behaviors are constructed from certain typed dependency and part-of-speech
as listed on Table 3.1. 1 We complete the missing component in behaviors if
another behavior with identical verb is found. Furthermore, we extend the subject
and object to noun phrases by adding adjective modifiers and identifying multi-word
expressions. To reduce the number of word variants, we can apply WordNet [105]
to lemmatize words based on their part of speech. From typed dependencies, we
decompose a complex sentence into several simple relations.
Table 3.2 shows one example of behavior extraction.
Filtering and weighting.
To determine which behaviors are most relevant to attacks, we assign weights
that capture how semantically close these behaviors are to the malicious function-
ality. We determine the weights in two steps:
1. Word weighting: assign weights for both verbs and noun phrases based on how
close they are to the problem.
2. Behavior weighting: assign weights to each behavior based on the weight of
subject, verb and object.
1We apply both collapsed and ccprocessed options in Standard typed dependency parser [104].
The former is to simplify the relationship with fewer prepositions and the latter is to propagate
the dependency if a conjunction is found.
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Table 3.1: Rules for matching behaviors. <gov> and <dep> represent the governor
word and dependent word in the typed dependency.
Rules Behavior





nmod:to <gov> to <dep>
nmod:with <gov> with <dep>
nmod:from <gov> from <dep>
nmod:over <gov> over <dep>
nmod:through <gov> through <dep>
nmod:via <gov> via <dep>
nmod:for <gov> for <dep>
We do not assign weights to behaviors directly because many behaviors appear only
few times in our paper corpus, which might bias our metrics.
In the first step, we should select a topic word that best describes the problem.
For example, we can select the word Android to engineer features for Android mal-
ware detection. We collect all the noun phrases from subject and object and verbs
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Table 3.2: An example of behavior extraction.
text ”For instance, the Zsone malware is designed to send
SMS messages to certain premium numbers, which will




Zsone malware send SMS message
Zsone malware send to certain premium number
certain premium number cause financial loss
certain premium number cause to infected user
in behaviors. Then, we evaluate the importance of each word2 by computing the
mutual information of the word and the topic word; we do this for both the verbs
and noun phrases from the behaviors. Formally, mutual information compares the
frequencies of values from the joint distribution of two random variables (whether
the two terms appear together in a document) with the product of frequencies from
two distributions that correspond to the individual terms. Mutual information mea-
sures how much knowing one value reduces uncertainty about the other one and is
widely utilized in text classification. However, in our case mutual information tends
to find general words but ignores the less frequent words. To solve this problem, we
scale the mutual information by the entropy of the word. The weight of word S(w)
2We use the term “word” for both single words and phrases.
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is calculated using Equation (3.1), where H(w) is the entropy of word w, I(w;wT )
is the mutual information between word w and topic word wT . This metric captures
the fraction of uncertainty of word w given the topic word, and the value ranges




= 1− H(w|wT )
H(w)
(3.1)
In the last step, we assign an initial weight for each behavior W (b) based on
the weights of verb and noun phrases The behavior weight W (b) is the product of
the verb weight W (v) and the maximum noun phrase weight, as shown in Equation
(3.2),
W (b) = W (v) ∗ max
n∈{s,o}
W (n) (3.2)
where behavior b consists of subject s, verb v, and object o.
3.1.3 Feature generation
We utilize the semantic network to rank the features and to determine which
ones are most relevant for detecting attacks. Let T , B, F be three random variable
for threat, behavior and feature respectively. We compute the probability of feature
πF from the probability of malware πM using Equation (3.3):
πF = πT ∗ PB|T ∗ PF |B (3.3)
The transition probability PB|T and PF |B is estimated using the edge weight of









The intuition behind this equation is that the most informative features corre-
spond to some malicious behaviors that are shared by multiple attacks, as captured
by the edge weights and the number of incoming edges. Additionally, we consider
the behavior weights to ensure that we propagate a higher weight to the behaviors
that are closely related to our problem.
3.2 Semantic network construction
We apply our technique to engineer features for Android malware detection.
Figure 3.1 shows the pipeline of feature engineering system.
3.2.1 Data sets
FeatureSmith analyzes three types of data: natural-language documents (e.g.
scientific papers), for extracting malware behaviors, lists of named entities related to
Android (e.g. development documentation that enumerate permissions, API calls,
etc.), for determining which features can be tested experimentally, and malware
samples, for validating the feature generation process. Table 3.3 summarizes these
data sets. In this chapter, we discuss the data collection process and the pre-



























Figure 3.1: General architecture for automatic feature engineering: (1) data col-
lection; (2) behavior extraction from scientific papers; (3) behavior filtering and
weighting; (4) semantic network; (5) feature generation; (6) explanation generation.
Black lines indicate the data flow and red dashed lines represent computations.
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3.2.2 Documents
Our primary data source consists of scientific papers. We utilize these pa-
pers to extract Android malware behaviors and to construct the semantic network.
From the electronic proceedings distributed to conference participants, we collect
the papers from the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P’08–S&P’15)3,
the Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF’00–CSF’14), and USENIX
Security (Sec’11). We complement this corpus by searching Google Scholar with the
keywords “Android malware”, and then we download the PDF files if a download
link is provided in the query results. This process may result in duplicate papers, if
a returned paper already exists in our corpus. Therefore, we record the hash of all
the papers in our corpus, and remove a PDF document if the file hash already exists
in the data set.4 Most of articles returned from Google Scholar are scientific papers
that require peer reviews before publication, which means that we can ensure the
quality of the corpus. Other data sources (e.g. analyst blogs) could be informative,
but the quality is not guaranteed. Google Scholar results include industry reports
as well. We believe that the industry reports are of high quality as well because
Google Scholar ranks articles based on citation [106] and these articles have high
ranks from it. In total, our corpus includes 1,068 documents. In addition, we also
collect the publication time for the articles using the conference year or the year
3Including workshop papers.
4It is possible that the same paper may have multiple hashes, for instance owing to multiple
versions of the same paper. We believe such cases are uncommon, and we do not attempt to detect
duplicated papers based on content similarity.
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Table 3.3: Summary of our data sets.















provided by Google Scholar, and successfully collect the time for 916 articles.
We extract the text from the papers in PDF format, for later processing.
Extracting clean text from PDF files is a non-trivial task as it is difficult to identify
figures, tables, algorithms and section titles embedded in the body content. We
develop several heuristics to address this problem. We convert the PDF files to text
with the Python pdfminer package, which also allows us to record the corresponding
font style and size. We consider that the body of the paper is written in the most
frequently used font in the document. We extract all the text in this font, as well as
single words in a different font but within the body content, which likely represent
emphasized words. This excludes the paper titles and the section headings; however,
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we found that this information is not necessary for automatic feature engineering.
Conversely, we also experimented with utilizing only the paper abstracts, which are
readily available on publisher web sites, but we found that they are insufficient for
our task.
3.2.3 Features
The features utilized for Android malware detection must be representative,
to capture the behavior of various malware families, and informative, to distinguish
the malware from benign apps. In this paper, we focus on permissions, intents, and
API calls as potential features for malware detection. We collect all the permissions,
intents and API calls from Android developer documents [107]. Then, we ignore
the class name for each feature, because we have found that class names are not
mentioned in most papers. However, removing the class name introduces ambiguity
in two cases: (1) the feature name coincides with a word or abbreviation that could
be frequently mentioned; (2) methods from different classes have the same name.
For the first case, we check if the function names can be split into several word
components based on the naming rules. For example, we could split onCreate into
on and Create, and SEND_SMS into SEND and SMS. Then we remove all the features
that cannot be split in this manner, which are more likely to collide with other words
and cause ambiguity. For the second case, most of identified informative features
are not ambiguous, e.g. sendTextMessage. For those ambiguous names, they often
have only one meaning in papers. For example, getDeviceId could be the method in
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either Telephony or UsbDevice, but the method refers to Telephony.getDeviceId
in almost every paper. In total, we have 132 permissions, 189 intents (including
both name and value), 11,373 API calls.
3.2.4 Malware families
We collect the malware family names from both the Drebin dataset [7] and
from a list of malware families [108] caught by the Mobile-Sandbox analysis plat-
form [109]. In total, we collect 280 malware names. We utilize these names when
mining the papers on Android malware to identify sentences that discuss malicious
behaviors. In addition to the concrete family names, we also utilize the term “mal-
ware” and its variants for this purpose.
For our experimental evaluation, we utilize malware samples from the Drebin
data set [7], shared by the authors. This data set includes 5,560 malware samples,
and also provides the feature vectors extracted from the malware and from 123,453
benign applications. While these feature vectors define values for 545,334 features,
FeatureSmith can discover additional features, not covered by Drebin. We therefore
extract these additional features from the apps.
We first select all malware samples and a random sample of equal size, drawn
from the benign apps. As the Drebin data set includes only malware samples, we
download the benign apps from VirusTotal [110], by searching for the corresponding
file hashes. After collecting the .apk files for all the apps, we use dex2jar to
decompile them to .jar files, and use Soot [111] to extract all the Android API
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calls. This allows us to expand the feature vectors and test the features omitted by
Drebin.
We obtain the expanded feature vectors for 5,552 malware samples and 5,553
benign apps.5 The collected applications exhibit 43,958 out of 545,334 Drebin fea-
tures and 133 out of 195 features generated by FeatureSmith. Note that we use
the malware samples only for the evaluation in Chapter 3.3; the feature generation
utilizes the malware names and the document corpus.
3.2.5 Network construction
After we extract the key components (i.e. malware, behaviors and features), we
construct the semantic network according to the definition in Chapter 3.1. Figure 3.2
shows part of our semantic network.
This step produces 339,651 unique behaviors. Then we choose the word An-
droid as the topic word to evaluate the importance of the behaviors. We remove the
behaviors that are unlikely relevant to Android, and obtain 82,035 behaviors. In
total, we have 47,186 noun phrases and 1,682 verbs. Table 3.4 shows the behaviors
with highest weights. Note that this is just the initial weight for how close the
behavior related to Android; the ranking of behaviors will change during feature
generation.
Table 3.5 shows the top 5 features extracted in this manner. The sendTextMessage
method and the SEND_SMS, RECEIVE_SMS permissions correspond to apps that send
text messages. The behaviors that contribute to these two features are also related
5For a few applications, we were unable to either decompile them or extract the method calls.
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kick background service
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Figure 3.2: Excerpt from our semantic network. The nodes correspond to mal-
ware families, malware behaviors, and concrete features. Unlike in an ontology, the
categories of malware behavior are not predetermined.
to text messages, e.g. “send SMS message”, “subscribe premium-rate service”. Mal-
ware often listens for the BOOT_COMPLETED event, which indicates that the system
finished booting. The corresponding behavior contains “register for related system-
wide event” and “kick off background service”. Papers using static or dynamic analy-
sis often mention onStart, as it is usually an entry point for malware behavior. This
feature can be reached from multiple behavior nodes, e.g. “send data to server” and
“register premium-rate service”, as it may be involved in various malicious activi-
ties. Besides, some other features related to user’s sensitive information have high
rank, for example, getDeviceId and READ_PHONE_STATE. The corresponding behav-
iors reveal the malicious actions like “return IMEI ” and “return privacy-sensitive
information”.
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Table 3.4: Top 5 behaviors related to Android.
rank behavior
1 Over-privileged apps overstep permission
2 manufacturer customize smartphone OS
3 malware author download Android’s source code
4 download from official Android Market
5 download from app store
Table 3.5: Top 5 features.
rank feature type




5 onStart API method
3.3 Evaluation results
We evaluate FeatureSmith by measuring the effectiveness of the automatically
generated features. In our experiments, we utilize a corpus of malicious and benign
Android apps, collected as described in Chapter 3.2. We train random forest clas-
sifiers [112] with (i) the features generated by FeatureSmith and (ii) the manually
engineered features from Drebin [7]. We compare the performance of these classi-
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Figure 3.3: ROC curve of malware detection for classifiers with different feature sets
(including the count of features utilized from each set, as the apps in our corpus
exhibit a subset of the manually and automatically engineered features).
fiers in Chapter 3.3.1. In Chapter 3.3.2, we drill down into FeatureSmith’s ability
to discover informative features that may be overlooked during the manual fea-
ture engineering process. Finally, we characterize the evolution of our community’s
knowledge about Android malware in Chapter 3.3.3.
3.3.1 Feature effectiveness
To evaluate the overall effectiveness of automatically engineered features, we
train 3 random forest classifiers with the same ground truth but different feature
sets:
• FS: All features from FeatureSmith
• F ′S: Top 10 features from FeatureSmith (F ′S ⊆ FS)
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• FD: Drebin features (FS * FD)
We randomly select 2/3 of apps for our training set and utilize the rest for the
testing set. We choose the random forest algorithm, which trains multiple decision
trees on random subsets of features and aggregates their votes for the final prediction,
because this technique is less prone to overfitting than other classifiers [112].
Figures 3.3a and 3.3b compare the performance of the three classifiers using
a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) plot. This plot illustrates the relation-
ship between false positives and true positives rates of these classifiers. The figure
suggests that automatically and manually engineered features are almost equally ef-
fective, as the ROC curves are practically indistinguishable. At 1% false positive
rate, the classifiers using FD and FS both have 92.5% true positives.
6 FS contains
much fewer features compared to FD (173 instead of 43,958 and 44 in common), but
this dimensionality reduction does not degrade the performance of classifier. The
features themselves are not equally informative; if we randomly select 173 features
from FD, the ROC curve is close to the diagonal, which means that the classifier is
equivalent to making a random guess. This suggests that FeatureSmith is able to
discover representative and informative features from scientific papers. When using
only the top 10 features suggested by FeatureSmith (feature set F ′S), our classifier
6We note that our goal is not to reproduce or exceed the performance of the Drebin malware
detector—we use random forests while Drebin uses SVM—but to perform a fair comparison of the
feature sets. Nevertheless, our classifier using FD achieves the same performance as reported in
the Drebin paper [7].
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achieves 44.9% true positives for 1% false positives. This is comparable to the perfor-
mance of three older malware detection techniques, which provide detection rates
between 10%–50% at this false-positive rate [7]. This shows that FeatureSmith’s
ranking mechanism singles out the most informative features for separating benign
and malicious apps.
We further examine all the false positive results (18 apps) from the testing set.
8 apps are labeled as malicious by at least one of VirusTotal’s anti-virus products,
perhaps because they were determined to be malicious after the Drebin paper was
published. Although these apps are considered benign in our dataset, they are
actually malicious, which suggests that our real false positive rate may be even
lower. Other benign apps from our false positive set exhibit behavior similar to
malware, including two Chinese security apps, which intercept incoming phone calls
and filter spam short messages, one Korean parental supervision app, which tracks
a child’s location, and a banking app. We could not find any information about the
remaining 6 apps.
3.3.2 Tapping into hidden knowledge
We evaluate the contribution of individual features to the classifier’s perfor-
mance by using the mutual information metric [34]. Intuitively, mutual information
quantifies the loss of uncertainty for malware detection when the app has the given
feature. Table 3.6 lists the 5 features with the highest mutual information. When
present together, these features indicate an app that triggers some activity right
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Table 3.6: 5 most informative features.
feature MI
#usage ranking
malicious benign FeatureSmith Keyword-TF
BOOT_COMPLETED 0.27 3,555(64%) 441(8%) 3 151
SEND_SMS 0.26 3,227(58%) 302(5%) 2 9
READ_PHONE_STATE 0.22 5,011(90%) 2,236(40%) 11 16
startService 0.18 3,408(61%) 791(14%) 60 37
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED 0.17 2,672(48%) 373(7%) 54 351
after booting the system, starts a background service, accesses sensitive information
and sends SMS messages. FeatureSmith ranks these features in the top-60, and the
three best features in the top-11.
To provide a baseline for comparison, we also compute a simpler ranking that,
unlike FeatureSmith, does not take into account the semantic similarity between fea-
tures and malicious behaviors. We extract all the API calls, intents and permissions
mentioned in our paper corpus, whether they are related to malware or not, and
we rank them by how often they are mentioned. This term frequency (TF) metric
is commonly used in text mining for extracting frequent keywords. This ranking
does not place the features from Table 3.6 among the top features. For example,
BOOT_COMPLETED and RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED are not mentioned frequently in
papers, and therefore have a low TF rank. Figure 3.4 shows the cumulative mutual
information for the top 150 features in the FeatureSmith and TF rankings. Be-
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Figure 3.4: Cumulative mutual information of top-ranked features.
cause it uses a semantic network, FeatureSmith assigns consistently higher ranks
for the features more likely to be related to malware, even if they are not men-
tioned very frequently. Additionally, we compute the Kendall rank correlation [113]
between FeatureSmith’s ranking and the mutual information based ranking, and
perform a Z-test to determine if the two ranking systems are correlated. The p-
value is 1.9 ∗ 10−4 (< 0.05) which demonstrates that FeatureSmith based ranking is
statistically dependent with the mutual information based ranking. We repeat the
hypothesis test for the TF based ranking, and we obtain a p-value is 0.14 (> 0.05).
Among the features with a low mutual information, we also find several in-
stances that are related to malware behaviors. For example, FeatureSmith identifies
createFromPdu, getOriginatingAddress and getMessageBody from [85], which
are used in Zitmo for extracting the message sender phone number of message con-
tent. FeatureSmith also identifies onNmeaReceiced and onLocationChanged, which
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could potentially leak location data [114], and isMusicActive, which can be used
to infer the user’s location [115]. These features do not help the classifier, as they
might not be representative of the malware families from the Drebin malware data
set, or the data set might not cover all the malware behavior. Nevertheless, these
features provide useful information to researchers interested in malware behavior.
FeatureSmith generates several informative features that are not included in
the Drebin feature set. For example, getSimOperatorName is mentioned in two
papers, as a method that apps often call after requesting the READ_PHONE_STATE per-
mission [116] and as a method that leaks private data [114]. getNetworkOperatorName
is another method that potentially leaks private data [117]. These two API calls are
not among the manually engineered Drebin features, but they have a high mutual in-
formation for malware detection. 884 malware samples invoke getSimOperatorName,
compared to 85 benign apps; getNetworkOperatorName appears in 1,341 malware
samples and in 378 benign apps. This suggests that automatic feature engineering
is able to mine published information that remains hidden to the manual feature
engineering process, as human researchers and analysts are unable to assimilate the
entire body of publicly available knowledge.
FeatureSmith can extract informative features effectively, but it can also gener-
ate explanations for features. For example, the behaviors associated to BOOT_COMPLETED
reveal that this feature could be an indicator of starting background service for the
malware. Instead of providing just a basic description of the feature, extracted
from Android developer documents, the explanation links the feature to malware
behaviors reported in the literature. Besides the BOOT_COMPLETED example, many
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leak privacy-sensitive return value
leak to remote web server
· · ·
Reference
[114]: Examples of such methods are getSimOperatorName in the Telephony-
Manager class (returns the service provider name), getCountry in the Locale
class, and getSimCountryIso in the TelephonyManager class (both return the
country code), all of which are correctly classified by SUSI.
features are related to “steal sensitive information” behavior, which will never be
identified by parsing developer documents only. Table 3.7 shows an explanation for
an API call that leaks personal data. These explanations refer to abstract concepts
that human analysts associate with malware behavior and provide semantic insights
into the operation of the malware detector, which is key for operational deployments
of such detectors [35].
3.3.3 Knowledge evolution over time
Our results from the previous chapter suggest that manual feature engineer-
ing may overlook some informative features, perhaps because it is challenging for
researchers and analysts to consider the entire body of published knowledge. In this
chapter, we characterize the growth of FeatureSmith’s semantic network, which is a
representation of the existing knowledge about Android malware. Intuitively, as we
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Figure 3.5: ROC curve of malware detection for classifiers with feature sets from
different years
add more documents to the system, we create more behavior nodes, and the underly-
ing structure of the network reflects the semantic similarity among these behaviors.
We investigate how this evolution affects our ability to engineer effective features
for malware detection. However, because we cannot identify the publish year for
some articles, we cannot reliably tell the earliest year that a feature is discovered by
FeatureSmith. For those features that we are able to identify the discovered year,
we train 4 malware detectors using the same algorithm with the features discovered
before 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015.
Figure 3.5 shows the ROC curve of the classifier trained using features discov-
ered in different years. The figure shows that, as more papers are published over
time and knowledge accumulates, FeatureSmith is able to generate more informa-
tive features and the performance of the corresponding classifier improves. At 1%
false positive rate, the true positive rate increases from 73.1% in 2012 to 89.2% in
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2015.7 In addition, we use the classifiers in different years to detect the malware
samples from different families. We determine the threshold by setting a fixed 1%
false positive rate. With a growing knowledge on malware behaviors, the classifier
performs better. For example, we are able to detect most of the samples from the
Gappusin family using the classifier in 2014, while we cannot detect any apps from
this family using the classifier in 2012. In 2012, the feature set primarily consists
of the permissions and API calls related to some obvious behaviors like SMS fraud.
However, in the later years, the publications started covering functions that could
leak sensitive information. As a result, we can detect Gappusin using the features
extracted two years later. In addition, the performance improvement diminishes
after 2013. This suggests that the most important and salient features are likely to
be discovered first. By using these features, we can capture the core behaviors from
malware. The follow-up work is able to tell the new behaviors or missing knowledge
from prior work. And the discovered features are complementary to the original
feature set and are useful in improving the detection performance.
7Because we cannot identify the publication years for some documents downloaded from Google
Scholar, in this experiment the true positive rate does reach our top rate of 92.5%.
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Chapter 4: Data-driven feature engineering
In this chapter, we introduce a data-driven feature engineering method called
ReasonSmith, which ranks features based on their global importance. In Chapter
4.1, we introduce the design of ReasonSmith. Then we evaluate ReasonSmith for
both Android and Windows malware detection. In Chapter 4.2, we demonstrate the
data set and data preprocessing used in the experiment. In Chapter 4.3, we compare
ReasonSmith with traditional metric mutual information, and further identify data
biases and artifacts.
4.1 Method
4.1.1 Feature importance criterion
To capture feature global importance, we would like to select a subset of
features (k out of n) that maximize the performance in testing. Let TPRF be the
true positive rate of a malware detector in testing using feature set F . Equation
(4.1) shows the criterion of feature selection based on the global importance, where
|F | is the cardinality of feature set F . We focus on the true positive rate when false






s.t. |F | = k
(4.1)
Intuitively, if we only use a subset of features in testing, the malware detector
should perform worse than the original system, because the model uses additional
features (i.e. the removed features) for training. If the performance of malware
detector does not drop after feature removal, then the model does not learn security
knowledge from the removed features. However, if the performance drops dramat-
ically, then the removed features should be important to characterize the security
knowledge learned by the model.
However, we cannot find an optimal solution for this problem in practice be-





feature subsets. As an alternative
solution, we can estimate the global importance for individual features, and further
select the features based on the importance. Therefore the original problem changes
to finding a ranking method such that the model can achieve high true positive rate
in testing by using the top k features.
4.1.2 ReasonSmith
Different from prior work on explaining instances [18–20], we focus on the over-
all performance of the features on the model, which extends the idea of generating
local interpretation and further derives a global interpretation. We call our ranking
method ReasonSmith. It first estimates feature importance for single instances, and
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then evaluates the global importance based on the local interpretations.
Local interpretation. Let x be the feature vector and w be the local inter-
pretation for the corresponding feature. A greater absolute value means that the
corresponding feature is more important. Feature influence w captures the local
influence of input x for the machine learning model y = f(x). There are several
techniques from prior work to obtain a local interpretation of a specific input. But
in our case, we need to collect the feature influence for individual instances in a
large scale. So we have a stronger constraint on computational complexity. Some
techniques like LIME [19] and LEMNA [18] do not satisfy our requirements, since
they need to train a separate model for each instance to be explained. To this end,
we choose gradient-based solution [20] to learn the feature importance. For each
instance to be explained, we can obtain the result by passing the input to the model
only once, and consequently it is possible for us to collect feature influence in a
large scale. In this dissertation, we define local interpretation as the gradient of
the output with respect to the input (as shown in Equation (4.2)). For malware
detection problem, the output is usually the probability that a sample is malware.
By definition, if the gradient is close to 0, then the corresponding feature is less





Global interpretation. From a global view, the interpretation is a random vari-
able. We use Gaussian mixture model to estimate the distribution of feature in-
fluence w. Let us assume that the machine learning model generalizes security
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knowledge from data and the knowledge can be summarized with K rules and each
local explanation comes from one of its rules.
Let us define feature importance score S as the metric of feature global impor-
tance, which is defined as the probability that w is non-zero. For a specific feature
j, the probability that its value is small can be written in Equation (4.3), where Rk
is the kth Gaussian distribution. For each Gaussian distribution, parameters can
be estimated using EM algorithm.
Sj = 1− P (wj = 0) = 1−
∑
k
P (wj = 0 | j ∈ Rk)P (j ∈ Rk) (4.3)
In a special case, let us assume that there is only one rule learned by the
model. Then we can estimate mean and covariance using Equation (4.4) and (4.5).
Because only one primary rule exists in this case, we can save much computation
from EM algorithm, which allows us to obtain a less precise but faster result. In












(wi − µw)(wi − µw)T (4.5)
In addition, the malware detector takes binary features as input. We set the
local interpretation to 0 if the corresponding feature is 0, because the model should
not be influenced by absent events. Equation (4.6) is the formula for binary features






4.1.3 Data bias analysis
The bias evaluation process consists of three steps:
1. Split data into several groups based on time.
2. Train individual models on different data groups, and apply ReasonSmith to
rank all the features by feature importance score S.
3. Compare feature rankings in different data groups.
Data split. Prior work shows that the performance of malware detector generally
degrades over time due to either concept drift or training biases [82]. It is difficult
to evaluate the future performance drop using conventional evaluation method like
cross validation. Therefore, we split the data based on time, which makes it possible
to identify the changes of data and model over time.
Then we train individual malware detectors using the same model and calcu-
late feature rankings from ReasonSmith for each data set.
Importance over time. We rank features by importance score S, and the features
with high scores are on the top of the list. We can obtain multiple rankings from
different data groups for features. Then we can calculate the average ranking and
ranking variance for a specific feature, which can be used to distinguish data artifacts
and data biases.
A higher ranking mean suggests that the feature is consistently important
across different groups. The features with high ranking mean are robust and useful
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Table 4.1: Data set after preprocessing
time span usage # of samples
Android
S1 07/01/2009 - 06/30/2012 train 21,635
S2 07/01/2012 - 08/31/2012 test 7,070
S3 09/01/2012 - 09/30/2012 test 18,873
S4 10/01/2012 - 01/01/2015 test 4,491
Windows
S5 07/01/2018 - 07/31/2018 train 71,919
S6 08/01/2018 - 08/20/2018 test 34,341
in different period of time, and are more likely to be indicative to the main func-
tionalities of malware. By manually examining these features, analysts can generate
hypotheses about the malware behaviors from the training data set. However, these
features can also be data artifacts. Different from data biases, data artifacts might
result from data generation mechanism and exist for a long period of time. Therefore
the features from data artifacts are likely to have a high ranking mean as well.
A high ranking variance indicates that the importance of the corresponding
feature changes a lot and the feature is only important in particular data groups.
Because data biases result from data sampling process, features from data biases
are likely to have high uncertainty values. By manually examining high-uncertainty




We collect malware samples for both Windows and Android systems from
VirusTotal [110] and Drebin [7]. Table 4.1 summarizes our data sets. Drebin pro-
vides a data set of Android reports from static analysis for 129,013 apps. Drebin
extracts 8 type of features: hardware components, requested permissions, app com-
ponents, filtered intents, restricted API calls, used permissions, suspicious API calls
and network addresses.
We collect Windows data set of 114,482 samples from VirusTotal by using
version 2 of their API. When a user submits a file under 8 megabytes in size which has
never been submitted before to VirusTotal, the sample is dynamically analyzed in a
custom Cuckoo Sandbox and the report becomes available via the /file/behaviour
API endpoint. In order to pull back all Windows samples which contain a sandbox
report, we use the behaviour search modifier and pair it with common file formats
used by malware. To gather our dataset, we pulled hashes that have an analysis
report attached to them which contain one of the following types:
1. PE executables: *.exe, *.dll
2. Python scripts: *.py
3. Malicious documents: *.rtf, *.doc(x), *.xls(x)
The dynamic analysis report is composed of two main parts; the sequence of
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windows API calls performed by the submitted sample and any of its descendants, as
well as all network traffic observed. Each observed API call contains all parameters
passed to that API call. For example, CreateProcessInternalW contains the full
file path of the launched process in the lpApplicationName parameter, and the
command line used to launch it will be in the lpCommandLine parameter. Network
traffic is made up of all HTTP, DNS, and IP traffic. HTTP requests contain all
relevant fields, such as HTTP method, user agent, destination host, URI, and request
body. DNS traffic contains the hostname requested and the IP it resolved it. IP
traffic contains the source and destination IP and ports used, as well as the protocol.
4.2.2 Data processing
For Android data, we apply the same data processing as we did in Chapter
3.2.1. Therefore, we only introduce the feature extraction and data filtering for
Windows data set in this chapter.
Feature extraction. Different from Android system where individual API calls
and permissions are semantically meaningful, Windows API calls only define the
actions, and are only meaningful with the arguments. Therefore, we define the
features as a combination of action (i.e. API calls) and target (i.e. arguments). We
further define several high-level actions based on API calls, which are listed in Table
4.2.
Target can be one of 6 types, including processes, files, domains, URIs, IP
addresses and registry keys. Then we apply the following rules to normalize the
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Table 4.2: Mapping between API calls and high-level actions.





















Table 4.3: Relationship between target types and high-level actions.
Target type Actions
Processes Launched, Injected
Files Created, Deleted, Copied, Moved, Read, Written
Registry Key Created Key, Enum Key, Enum Value, Open Key, Open
Key, Query Value, Set Value,Set Value
Modules Loaded
Shell Command Executed
Addresses Connected To, Resolves To
URLs URI Of, HTTP Request To
Domain DNS Query For, Domain Of
target string.
1. Normalize Windows file path by using default environment variable. For ex-
ample, C:\Program Files is normalized to %ProgramFiles%.
2. Identify GUID, SID, and replace them by a fixed token <GUID> or <SID>.
3. Replace SHA256 process names by <SELF>, because VirusTotal renames sub-
mitted executables to the SHA256 hash of their contents.
Then we encode the high-level action and normalized argument string as binary
features that are readable by neural networks.. Table 4.3 lists all types of features
in Windows data set.
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Sample filtering. Because Windows feature set is collected from dynamic analysis
instead of static analysis, it is likely that we cannot observe the correct and complete
execution traces. There we remove the samples if their total execution time is less
than 2 seconds, or drwtsn32 is called which is an indicators for crashes.
Creation time estimation. We approximate the sample creation time using the
first submission time from VirusTotal report, which is an upper bound for the sample
creation time. We split the samples into different data sets to by their creation time
identify data biases. Table 3.3 gives basic statistics for different data sets.
Label Creation. In addition, the label of samples are determined from anti-virus
labels. For Windows application, we label it as malicious if it has more than a 30%
detection rate from VirusTotal, which is the same threshold used in prior work [30,
100]. While for Android application, we label it as malicious if there are more than
4 detections from AV vendors, which is also in line with prior work [82, 118]. If
there are no AV detections, we label the application as benign. We drop the rest of
applications if they do not satisfy either malicious or benign criterion.
4.2.3 Analyst features
We define analyst features as the features that are manually engineered by
analysts and are used for detecting malware. For the Android data set, we select
4 Drebin feature categories as the analyst features: permissions, real permissions,
restricted API calls and suspicious API calls. Because permissions are important in
Android to protect sensitive data and crucial services, they are used as key features
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in most of Android malware detectors. Similarly, restricted APIs are the API calls
protected by the permissions, and can also be considered as analyst features. In
Drebin, the authors manually developed heuristic rules to identify suspicious API
calls. In total, we consider 373 features as semantic features (out of 11,731 features).
For the other 4 feature types, the analysts simply use all the features that observed
in the data set for example, a specific URL or a user-defined activity name. As a
result, we do not consider them as analyst features.
Cuckoo sandbox provides over 400 manually crafted signatures to analyze ex-
ecution traces and label suspicious behaviors. Although these signatures include
many human-defined conditions, which are difficult to be directly applied to ML
systems, the individual rules used in signatures can also be a good indicator of
maliciousness. We extract all the regular expressions in the Signature class from
Cuckoo repository [88], and then check if our features match any of the regular ex-
pressions. As a result, we identify 1271 compilable regular expressions, from which
we further label 867 features as semantic features (out of 41,858 features).
4.3 ReasonSmith evaluation
First, we train 2 deep neural networks for Android and Windows malware
detection. We use multi-layer perceptron as basic architecture which contains two
hidden layers with 1024 and 32 nodes respectively. The detector takes binary fea-
tures as input and returns the likelihood of maliciousness. We use ReLU as the
activation function for all hidden nodes and sigmoid function in the output layer.
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Table 4.4: Performance of Windows and Android malware detectors. Note that S1
and S5 are used as the training sets.
testing set TP(FP=0.01) TP(FP=0.05) TP(FP=0.1)
Android
S1 0.962 1.000 1.000
S2 0.896 0.951 0.957
S3 0.858 0.878 0.890
S4 0.890 0.917 0.926
Windows S5 0.996 1.000 1.000
S6 0.948 0.956 0.992
Since the feature set contains some features that have low occurrence which might
negatively affect the system performance, we remove those uncommon features dur-
ing training. In this work, the feature occurrence threshold is 50 for both detectors.
As a results, the size of input feature is 41,858 for the Windows detector and 11,731
for the Android detector. Table 4.4 shows the performance of the two malware detec-
tors, and both models have high true positives and low false positives in testing. We
use these two detectors as the example in this dissertation, and apply ReasonSmith
to examine the model and the data.
4.3.1 Feature ranking performance
As we discussed in Chapter 4.1.1, we measure the performance loss if we use a
subset of features in testing. In general, dropping features causes the model losing
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information learned during training, and therefore performance should decrease1.
We choose mutual information as the baseline metric to rank features, which is
usually used to measure feature global importance in tree-based models. For a fair
comparison, two feature sets must contain the same number of features. Because
machine learning system returns the likelihood of maliciousness, which will have
different results using different thresholds. To make the performance comparable,
we use true positive rate as basic performance metric when false positive rate reaches
0.01.
Figure 4.1 shows the true positive rate for both training and testing sets when
true positive rate is 0.01. Figure 4.1a and 4.1e shows the experiment for training
set. If we remove the features with low ranks, then the performance drop is smaller
for ReasonSmith ranking than that for mutual information ranking. ReasonSmith
outperforms mutual information in all feature sizes, which shows that ReasonSmith
captures important features learned by neural networks. It also suggests that some
important features by neural networks are invisible by only looking at the rela-
tionship between output and individual features. In addition, ReasonSmith has a
better performance than mutual information based ranking in most of experiments
for testing sets. However, because the estimation is based on training sets and it is
not a guarantee that the underlying distribution of testing set is the as training set,
ReasonSmith ranking has lower false positive rate than mutual information ranking
in some cases.







































































































































Figure 4.1: Performance of malware detector when only a subset of features is used in
testing. “rs” represents ReasonSmith based ranking, while “mi” represents mutual
information based ranking. Note that S1 and S5 are used as training set.
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4.3.2 Malicious behaviors
To identify the features that are robust over time, we train separate models
for each data set using the same configuration, and run ReasonSmith to rank the
features. Then we calculate mean and variance of the rankings from different data
set.
Features that are consistently important across different training sets are ro-
bust against concept drift or sampling biases. However, These features can be either
suspicious behaviors or artifacts caused by a particular environment. To verify if
DNN model actually learns and generalizes suspicious behaviors, we manually ex-
amine the features with high ranking mean.













The following features have highest average ranking in Android experiment.
1. Feature android.hardware.touchscreen
2. API call getSystemService
3. Intent android.intent.action.MAIN





9. API call org.apache.http.impl.client.DefaultHttpClient
10. Permission INTERNET
Known behaviors. We compare features with highest ranking mean with analyst
features to test if machine learning model and human analysts can reach an agree-
ment on important features. Figure 4.2 shows the number of overlapping features
between two feature sets. In general, the top features selected by models are dif-
ferent from analyst features. Only 27 features (Android) and 2 features (Windows)
are in the top 100 features for the models.
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Android Windows


























Figure 4.2: The number of overlapping features between data-driven features and
knowledge-based features. Biases removed means feature set is selected based on
significance across different data groups, and we use the feature ranking directly
from training set in the case without bias removal.
In addition, we do the same analysis for the feature ranking without removing
data biases. We use the ranking from S1 and S5 as examples. We find that it is more
likely to include analyst features if we use ranking mean to rank features than simply
using ranking from one data set. It suggests that data biases memorized by the
machine learning model is less important in a long-term evaluation. By combining
the knowledge over time, the model is more likely to generalize the knowledge that
is close to human analysts. It also suggests that human analysts take into account
if the features are useful in the future when they engineer features.
We find that machine learning system actually learns some similar knowledge
as human analysts. For example, the presence of vboxminirdrdn (rank 20) can be


















Figure 4.3: Feature frequency. We remove feature outliers with feature frequency
greater than 0.025.
Cuckoo signatures.
Compared to Windows experiment, the Android model is more likely to reach
an agreement with human analysts. One possible reason is that Android features
have higher occurrence in general, and human analysts are good at finding features
from common behaviors. However, Windows features, which includes the argument
string, have more variations, which makes it difficult for human analysts to identify
the common behaviors. Figure 4.3 shows the feature frequency for both Android
and Windows.
New behaviors. Machine learning model is also able to learn suspicious behaviors
that are overlooked by human analysts. For example, querying value from registry
key HKLM\software\microsoft\cryptography (rank 8) indicates an intent to get
machine GUID. This behavior itself is not malicious, but it is usually the first step
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for attackers to fingerprint the victims and keep tracking them. Similar behaviors
are also used for Android malware, which uses API call getDeviceId to get the
machine ID.
Another example of the missing behavior is querying value from registry key
...\explorer\shell folders, which ranks 17 in our experiment. The registry
key stores the default path of user shell folders, for example, “My Documents”,
“My Photos”, etc.. It might correspond to the attempts to access user’s data, e.g.
steal personal information or encrypt user documents.
4.3.3 Artifacts
Since machine learning model only generalizes security knowledge from data,
the most significant and robust features used by the model is likely to result from
data artifacts. We find that many top features in our experiment come from data
artifacts. Even though the model can achieve high true positive rate with low false
positive rate in experimental setting, the features may not be meaningful for human
analysts.
In summary, we find 3 types of data artifacts from our experiments, i.e.
environment-sensitive features, side-effects from malicious behaviors, and missing
components.
Environment-sensitive features.
Environment-sensitive features are the features that directly relate to the ma-
licious behaviors of malware, but the behaviors might be different in different envi-
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ronment.
For example, ...\mozilla\ctvqzym.exe (rank 5) and %path%\tasks\hiqvsnd.job
(rank 6) are two malicious payloads from Win32/Kryptik malware family. Our
dataset contains 4589 samples from this family, and every sample show the same
pattern of activity: an executable payload named ctvqzym.exe is dropped in a
folder mimicking mozilla and a schedule task to maintain persistence is created us-
ing the hiqvsnd.job file. All samples used the exact same names and file paths for
their dropped files.
Although these features are important in our dataset to distinguish malicious
and benign samples, they may not be extended outside Cuckoo sandbox environ-
ment. For example, while the combination of dropping the executable in a mozilla
folder and creating the scheduled task in a .job file is a behavior performed by
all samples in the Kryptik family, the consistent file names is not. We find that
running the same samples in a different sandbox yield different file names for both
the scheduled task file and the dropped executable. We run the sample in two other
sandboxes, on the first, the executable is named byiamvi.exe and the scheduled
task file is named rwdqoxi.job, on the second, they are named ltyfsyc.exe and
bikzrwg.job. At a high level, the way the model learned to detect samples from the
Kryptik family is through the combination of the above two features, creating the
executable and setting up the scheduled task. In reality, the model learned to hone
in on two values which are artifacts of the used sandbox environment. In practice,
the model will not be able to correctly classify Kryptik samples on any host that is
not configured the exact same way the sandbox was.
81
Another example of environment-sensitive artifact is connecting to 10.0.2.2,
which ranks 18 in our experiment. The IP address is in internal IP ranges, which is
used as the gateway for guest OS by default in Windows when it tries to connect to
host OS. The event can appear when the malware scans network ranges, or attempts
to move laterally to other machines. All the activities from the malware are isolated
in sandbox environment, and the network connection is guarded through an internal
gateway, which in our case is 10.0.2.2. However, the network traffic will never go
through the internal gateway in practice.
The third example is executing (null) commend (rank 4). This feature is
the event that an command execution is monitored but Cuckoo fails to obtain the
actual command string. This is possibly because malware launches other application
via an unusual way which causes some unexpected errors in Cuckoo to obtain the
command string. It does not tell the actual command the program trying to run,
but makes the behavior stands out by accident.
Side-effects from malicious behaviors. Different from environment-sensitive
features, we use side-effects to refer to the behaviors that are not from attackers,
but are highly correlated with malicious behaviors.
For example, dynamic analysis is likely to include behaviors from operating
system. To run start a new process, system might check software restriction policy
from registry key ...\safer\codeidentifiers (rank 9) and search for the com-
mand under registry key HKCR\*\shell (rank 16). To communicate with remote
server, the system might open registry key ...networkprovider\hworder (rank
82
19) that stores the network provider order and open pipe pipe\wkssvc (rank 21)
that maintains network connection with remote server. In addition, the relationship
between these correlated behaviors might be difficult to verify if they are applicable
in different environments, e.g. different Windows versions.
Missing components. Because malware usually have limited functionalities, mal-
ware may not have some common modules that are usually implemented in benign
applications. For example, feature android.hardware.touchscreen (rank 1) is
common and present in the manifest in almost every Android applications that re-
quire touch screen, and therefore it is impossible to be considered as important for
human analysts. Table 4.5 shows the percentage of applications that do not require
touch screen feature. We find that the percentage of malware is high for the apps
without touchscreen feature especially when the apps exhibit sensitive behaviors.
One possible reason is that there is no need for malware author to implement a
UI if the malware is only a service. Another benefit for disabling touchscreen is
that the malware is likely to be exposed to more devices from Android market like
Google Play where the app list is determined by customers’ devices. However, these
features cannot tell any actual behaviors of Android apps, event though they are
useful to distinguish malicious from benign apps. In addition, attackers can easily
create evasive samples by adding those missing components in Android manifest,
which makes the system vulnerable in practice.
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Table 4.5: Percentage of malware under certain conditions.
Condition Total No touchscreen
Call bin/su 83.5% 100%
Call getSubscriberId 62.2% 92.3%
Call getDeviceId 38.8% 72.7%
Connect to maps.google.com 50.9% 89.7%
4.3.4 Biases and concept drift
Features that are important to only a few training sets indicates the differences
of data sets. Such difference possibly results from sampling bias and concept drift.
It is likely that during a specific time one particular malware family is prevalent but
suddenly becomes inactive at some point. The sampling bias makes system vulner-
able by emphasizing the behaviors from a specific malware family. Additionally, the
difference in data sets can be the result of concept drift as well. It is well-known
in security community that malware is always showing new behaviors in order to
evade detections. Top 10 features with highest ranking variance in Android data
are listed below.
1. Intent android.intent.action.BATTERY_CHANGED_ACTION
2. API call android.os.Handler.sendMessageDelayed
3. Service receiver com.google.update.UpdateService
4. Activity com.google.update.Dialog
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5. Service receiver com.google.update.Receiver
6. API call java.util.SortedMap.entrySet
7. API call java.util.GregorianCalendar.after
8. API call android.widget.TextView.setInputType
9. Activity .Activity1
10. API call java.io.RandomAccessFile.writeByte
The top 10 features with highest ranking variance for Windows are listed below.
1. Write c:\python27\pythonw.exe
2. Open key HKCR\jpegfile
3. Open key HKCR\http
4. Open key HKLM\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\
internet settings\zonemap\domains\dnsnb8.net
5. Copy %programfiles%\winrar\rar.exe
6. Open key HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\
internet settings\zonemap\domains\dnsnb8.net
7. Create key HKLM\software\gtplus
8. Open HKLM\system\currentcontrolset\control\securityproviders\saslprofiles
9. Create c:\documents and
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10. Create c:\documents
Figure 4.4 shows the top 10 features with highest ranking variance for Android
data set. Most of features are dominant in one particular family (either benign or
malicious). If one malware family is prevalent in a particular time, then the model
learns it as the general knowledge for security. If the malware family becomes less
prevalent or changes the behavior, then the important features learned from the
past is no longer useful. For example, intent BATTERY_CHANGED_ACTION is used only
in DroidKungfu family in our data set, and therefore is useful in detecting mal-
ware for the model. However, DroidKungfu family becomes less and less prevalent
in dataset. 9.2% of malicious apps belong to this family in S1, but the percent-
age decreases to 4.7%, 1.9% and 2.1% in S2, S3 and S3 respectively. It suggests
that this intent becomes less useful in detecting malware over time. Similarly, ac-
tivity com.google.update.Dialog, service receiver com.google.update.Receiver
and com.google.update.UpdateService become less important since DroidKungfu
gradually disappears. It is common in security that malware keeps evolving due to
arms race. If the malware is detected and the attack becomes less effective, then the
attackers have to change their strategy. Since we cannot distinguish if the malware
indeed disappears in the wild, the drifted security knowledge can be a result from
sampling bias as well.
We find a similar trend for Windows experiment as well. Figure 4.5 shows
the distribution of malware families for the top 10 features with high uncertainty.


























































































































































































































































Figure 4.4: Top 10 features with the highest uncertainty (Android). An empty
family represents benign samples
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ily wapomi. The frequency of this malware family is 2.7%, and the frequency of this
family decreases to 0.5%. Although the frequency change is not large, the machine


















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.5: Top 10 features with the highest uncertainty (Windows). An empty
family represents benign samples.
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Chapter 5: Feature engineering for malware campaigns
In this chapter, we explore the feature engineering problem for malware de-
livery campaigns. In Chapter 5.1, we introduce a chain model for malware delivery
campaigns, which considers both existing campaign ontology and common informa-
tion mentioned in security blogs. In Chapter 5.2, we evaluates the performance of
IOC detection and categorization. In Chapter 5.3, we analyze the effect of different
baiting techniques on binary delivery.
5.1 Malware delivery model
5.1.1 Definition
The emerging standards for sharing threat intelligence [23–25] are based on the
observation that cyber attacks often follow certain high-level patterns. This allows
analysts to define generic models for representing and sharing the information.
In particular, the STIX standard [25] has been adopted by an increasing num-
ber of security products [119]. STIX defines a comprehensive schema that uses
IOCs to describe campaigns [25]. In this schema, a campaign consists of a set of
indicators which specify an attack pattern. An Indicator is then defined to be
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a set of observables, which includes all the resources and infrastructure in the
attack pattern. An Observable, defined in CybOX (v2.1) [24], contains 88 different
types including URI, IP address, file, registry key, etc.. To add semantics for the
attack pattern, STIX defines kill_chain_phase as an attribute for indicator. A
kill chain1 breaks down an attack in a sequence of stages. The original definition of
the cyber kill chain [103] specified 7 stages: reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery,
exploitation, installation, command & control and actions on objective.
Malware delivery campaigns. To represent malware delivery campaigns, we
adopt three stages from the STIX data model: exploitation, installation, and com-
mand & control. Additionally, we redefine the first stage of these campaigns based
on our observation that, while attackers will sometimes gain an initial foothold on
a host by delivering malicious files (e.g. as email attachments), in other causes they
rely on malvertising to lure users to an exploit kit’s landing page or to persuade
them to download and install a dropper. We therefore replace the delivery stage
with a baiting stage, which captures all these strategies.
There are 4 different types of indicators, which cover the most common and
important stages involved in malware delivery.
1. Baiting : This is the first stage of delivery campaign. The most common ap-
proaches to draw users to the malware delivery chain are email spam, malver-
tising and compromised sites. Once the user clicks on a link from a spam
1“Kill chain” is a military term describing the stages of an attack that results in the destruction
of a target (i.e. a “kill”). Separating the attack stages is helpful for identifying different defensive
techniques that could break the chain and disrupt the attack.
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message, or visits a compromised site, the browser will be redirected to a ma-
licious site. Before landing on the exploit server, users might be redirected
through several relay pages, which are included this stage.
2. Exploitation: After user is redirected to the landing page of an exploit kit, the
exploit server fingerprints the browser and the installed plugins and tries to
identify open vulnerabilities. The server then tries to exploit a vulnerability
and deliver a payload.
3. Installation: A malicious payload is downloaded on the end host, and the
exploit server installs and executes the malware. Without using exploits, at-
tackers can also lure users to install and execute the malware through social
engineering.
4. Command & Control : The executed malware contacts its command and con-
trol server and receives remote commands. The commands may involve down-
loading the next stage of the malware, dropping unrelated samples (e.g. in
the case of a Pay-per-Install infrastructure [31]) or performing other malicious
actions (e.g. spam, DDoS).
These stages are not necessary for every payload delivery. For example, campaigns
can entice users to download and install the payload by users themselves through
social engineering. In this case, the exploit stage would be unnecessary.
Table 5.1 lists all the observables we use for each type of indicators. Observable
contains 6 types, i.e. URL, IP address, file hash, malware family, exploit kit, and
vulnerability, in which CybOX observable includes the former 3 types. Figure 5.1
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shows one example of how the malware delivery schema can well fit the actual blog
posts. Our payload delivery model simplifies the data model in STIX in that (1) we
primarily focus on network activity in the campaign rather than the behavior on the
victim machine, and (2) many observables are unlikely to be discussed in security
articles and cannot be used to uniquely determine the campaign. Note that the
term IOC (indicator of compromise) is equivalent to the concept of an observable
in STIX. In order not to confuse the reader, we use the terms IOC and indicator
phase instead of STIX’s observable and indicator in rest of this paper.
A campaign group corresponds to the actors of a campaign, represented by a
set of IOCs. A supplier corresponds to an actor that provides delivery services by
controlling droppers in the field. A tier-1 supplier is a supplier that operates baiting
and exploitation domains.
High-risk binaries. We utilize the VirusTotal service [110] to assess the binaries
recorded in the measurement data. VirusTotal provides file scan reports for up to 54
anti-virus (AV) products. In line with prior work [33], if a binary receives more than
30% anti-virus detection from VirusTotal, then we considered it a high-risk binary.
Because the blog posts discuss both malware and potentially unwanted programs
(PUPs), we do not aim to distinguish if a specific binary is malware or PUP. Instead,
we focus on binaries that present a high risk to the end hosts because (1) they are
highlighted as security threats in the articles we analyze, and (2) they have a high
detection rate among AV products. A high-risk download is a download event with







































(b) Structured malware delivery campaign
Figure 5.1: An example of mapping unstructured blog post to structured schema
for malware delivery.
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Table 5.1: IOCs and indicator phase in malware delivery model.

















Generality. Our system for mining security articles requires a model of the mali-
cious activity to extract the relevant semantics. The model defined in this section
is specific to malware delivery campaigns; however, our NLP techniques are generic
and may be applied to other models. The results in this paper could be extended
to other cyber threats by defining a pertinent model, for example by starting from
an existing standard such as STIX.
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5.1.2 Classification
In this section we describe the design of ChainSmith, a system that extracts
and categorizes IOCs from security technical articles in colloquial English, according
to the schema defined in Chapter 5.1.1. The key intuition behind ChainSmith is that
the context words in adjacent sentences indicate the stage of a campaign, and the
context words that directly relate to the IOC determine its level of maliciousness.
In addition, we are able to group IOCs from different actors by considering the
campaign stages and article post time.
Figure 5.2 shows the architecture of ChainSmith. The system consists of 6
components: article crawler, expression detector, syntactic parser, semantic parser,
named entity recognition, and IOC classifier. In this chapter, we first describe the
data collection in Chapter 5.1.3 and then introduce the design of the classifier in
Chapter 5.1.4.
5.1.3 Data collection
Just like the actors involved in malware delivery tend to specialize on narrow
tasks, security analysts also focus on specific phases of the delivery campaigns. The
full picture of an end-to-end campaign often emerges only after reading articles from
multiple sources. We therefore implemented a generic crawler to collect security
articles published online.
We use our crawler to mine 10 sources, listed in Table 5.2. We select these
sources in that (1) the articles are likely to include detailed information about the
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Figure 5.2: Architecture of ChainSmith. The article crawler module is not shown
in this figure.
campaign, and (2) the sources are diverse—including news websites covering cyber
threats, blogs from anti-virus companies, or the personal blogs of security experts.
5.1.4 Campaign extraction
Since the design of expression detector, syntactic parser, semantic parser,
named entity recognition follows standard syntactic analysis (Chapter 1.4) or has
been used in FeatureSmith, we focus on IOC classifier in this chapter.
The primary goal of this step is to identify whether the given word is an IOC
as well as the stage of the campaign it belongs to. Basically, we select 2 types of
features for this task.
Sentence-level feature. This type of feature captures the topic of the sentence
and is useful to detecting the categories of features. First, we identify informative
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Table 5.2: Summary of security articles. For some articles, we fail to identify the
posting time.
Article source Time span Count
Forcepoint 2010-02-11 – 2017-05-13 227
Hexacorn 2011-10-01 – 2017-05-15 331
Malwarebytes 2012-04-20 – 2017-05-15 1590
Sophos 2000-11-24 – 2017-04-17 1171
Sucuri 2009-09-13 – 2017-05-12 927
TaoSecurity 2003-12-01 – 2017-05-08 2653
Trend Micro 2009-09-13 – 2017-05-15 1382
Virus Bulletin 2005-09-01 – 2016-01-29 601
WeLiveSecurity 2009-05-08 – 2017-05-16 4295
Webroot 2009-03-23 – 2017-05-14 978
Total 2000-11-24 – 2017-05-16 14155







where T is the set of categories, w is word we evaluated, p(w) is the probability
of word w, and p(w|t) is the probability that word w will be used for describing
topic t. A higher word score means that w is more likely to be used in a certain
campaign phase. For example, iframe, src, malvertising have high scores for the
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topic phishing, and exploit-serving has a high score for topic of exploitation. We
consider informative words to be words with high score and high occurrence. For
each sentence, we determine the context from 3 sources: (1) informative words
from the current sentence; (2) informative words from previous sentences, if no
informative words are found for the current sentence; and (3) informative words
from the previous sentence that mention the same IOC. The motivation behind
source 2 is that the topic of an article is usually consistent. For example, if the topic
of current sentence is command and control, then it is very likely that the next
sentence is also discussing command and control. The last context source comes
from the observation that the same entity can be discussed repeatedly in different
sentences. We use 3 types of features to identify the sentence topic:
• Average word embedding of the context words.
• Average word embedding of the article title.
• Number of entities of each type.
Word-level feature. This type of feature provides word-specific information and
is useful to provide additional validation for classification results. The entities in
the same sentence may not be of the same category. Therefore, I propose some
word-level features that differentiate between the entities.
• Average dependency embedding for all dependencies connected to the named
entity.
• Type specific feature.
99
The first feature is useful in determining which category the named entity belongs
to, since the dependency tells the grammatical structure within a sentence. The type
specific feature is useful to tell if an entity is malicious. For example, the mis-click
prevention strategy (e.g. “hxxp” and “[dot]”) is an indicator of the maliciousness
of URLs and IP addresses.
Classifier design. We first train a classifier to check if the topic of a sentence falls
in any of these 4 phases using sentence-level features. Because the topic may not
be mutually exclusive, we train 4 binary classifiers to identify topic probabilities.
We implement the classifier using neural network with 1 hidden layer and 50 hidden
nodes. To reduce the false positives, we skip the IOC candidates if no informative
words are found.
Next, we use the result of topic classification as the feature for another neural
net for IOC classification. The candidate IOCs extracted in the previous steps may
not be related to malware delivery campaigns. For example, a file hash mentioned
in the blog post may refer to a benign executable, such as a new patch or anti-virus
product. To verify that the named entities identified represent IOCs of a campaign,
we train a multi-class classifier for each entity type (e.g. URL, IP address) using
both topic probabilities and word-level features. Instead of applying a softmax layer
to the output layer, we use a logistic function to scale the output probability, such
that the sum of the probabilities is not necessarily to be 1. To reduce the false
positive rate, we add a special label “malicious” as another output, for the case
when the classifier returns more than one label from a single sentence. For these
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IOCs, the classifier cannot reliably tell which stages they belong to. Therefore,
rather than drop the results, we label them as “malicious”.
Campaign group identification. Technical articles are likely to mention both
suppliers and customers in the underground economy. From our manual investi-
gation, we find that different from scientific literature, security blogs usually dis-
cuss one observation from single campaign rather than investigate the problem in a
broader view. For example, blog posts are likely to record the current status of single
campaign as shown in Figure 5.1. However, unlike scientific literature, the compar-
ison between different campaigns is usually absent from blog posts. Therefore, we
assume that each technical article discusses one supplier and multiple customers. For
each article, we group all the IOCs in baiting and exploitation phase as one group
and consider the other IOCs as individual groups (one IOC for each group). In
addition, as campaigns may change infrastructure and strategies over time to evade
detection, we must connect campaigns from different articles in order to study the
long-term behavior and campaign evolution. We use a more conservative idea to
connect different campaigns with the same IOCs than the method in [57] . If two
campaigns contain identical IOCs and appear within a short time frame of another,
then we consider that they are in fact the same campaign. For example, if one
domain is mentioned by two articles in May 2012 and August 2012, then we group
the campaigns from two articles. In this study, we choose the time window to be
6 months, which means that the campaign groups are merged only if they share
common IOCs and are discussed within 6 months of one another.
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Figure 5.3: Screenshot of annotation website.
5.2 Evaluation results
A key challenge for semantics extraction is the lack of a ground truth. While
IOCs are available on several threat intelligence platforms, the malware delivery
phase that these IOCs correspond to are usually unavailable. To train and evaluate
ChainSmith, we built a web application for manually annotating articles, as shown in
Figure 5.3. The annotators can first specify which campaign stage the IOC belongs
to and then enter the IOC name in the box. This tool allows us to collect the
ground truth for our system. 4 graduate students from our group participated in the
annotation exercise. To increase their chances of extracting meaningful information
about malware delivery campaigns, we presented only articles that contain at least
20 named entities for labeling. In this way, we annotate 153 articles and 6264 IOCs.
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Even with the ground truth collected from manual annotation, off-the-shelf
NLP techniques are inadequate for characterizing malware delivery campaigns. We
design a baseline system that models the campaign stage classification using tradi-
tional topic modeling. We consider each sentence as an individual document, and
train a topic model using Latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) [121]. LDA is an unsu-
pervised algorithm widely used for topic modeling. For example, the Toronto Paper
Matching System (TPMS) [122] employs LDA to model the reviewers’ research ar-
eas and the areas of papers under submission. Additionally, a growing number of
conferences utilize TPMS for making automated reviewer assignments. After train-
ing in this manner, we identify the topic for each stage using the training set. If
a sentence belongs to one malware campaign stage, then we extract all the named
entities and label them as the attribute of that stage.
We use 5-fold cross-validation to evaluate the performance of ChainSmith and
of our baseline system. Table 5.3 shows the results. ChainSmith achieves 91.9%
precision and 97.8% recall, which is 13.7% and 31.1% higher than the baseline
model, respectively. Since the campaign stage classification is a multi-class problem,
we take the average precision and recall for all classes. Out of the detected IOCs, we
are able to classify 86.2% of them into a campaign stage with 78.2% precision and
80.7% recall, which is more than twice as high as the baseline model. 2 ChainSmith
outperforms the baseline because it is able to better determine the sentence context
2Because ChainSmith is able to detect but fails to categorize part of IOCs, we cannot precisely
calculate the recall . For a fair comparison to the baseline model, we calculate the lower bound by
multiplying the classification rate (86.2%) to the recall (80.7%).
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Table 5.3: Performance comparison of ChainSmith and a baseline NLP system,






Precision avg Recall avg
ChainSmith 78.2% 69.6%– 80.7%
Baseline 37.0% 28.7%
and the informative words.
We run ChainSmith on all 14,155 articles we collected, and discover 24,653
IOCs. Table 5.4 shows the summary for each type of IOCs. In addition, from
the extracted IOCs, we further identify 8,902 campaign groups mentioning either
suppliers or customers. We use one Sun Fire X2200 M2 server with 8 logical proces-
sors and 8GB RAM for this experiment. Extracting IOCs from one security article
requires 0.214 seconds on average for each article.
To assess the need for ChainSmith, we collect 568,348 fully qualified domains
and 297,218 IPv4 addresses from Hailataxii [29], a repository providing threat in-
telligence feeds in the STIX format [25]. 3 Compared to the IOCs collected from
3The data is collected by 2016-12-15.
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ChainSmith, only 60 overlapping domains and 26 overlapping IP addresses are found
in both data sets, and Jaccard index is 1.0 ∗ 10−4 and 8.7 ∗ 10−5 for domain and IP
address respectively. This illustrates the fact that most of the indicators discussed
in the threat intelligence reports are not made available in a machine-readable for-
mat. Moreover, none of the IOCs from Hailataxii specifies the kill_chain_phase
attribute, which would preclude the analysis we conduct in the rest of this section
from being performed on the dataset.
Next, we link the campaign groups extracted from blog posts to Kwon et al.’s
data set of download events [30]. This data set is based on Symantec’s WINE plat-
form, which provides security telemetry from real-world hosts. Each download event
in the data set specifies the file hash of the downloader and its payload (the down-
loaded file), and optionally the URL or IP from which the payload was downloaded.
In total, the telemetry data records 50.5M download events from 5M real-world
users. Using the download event data, we check if IOCs for each campaign group
are used as the downloader or downloading portal. We are able to find the subse-
quent download events for 59 groups, 37 of which produce high-risk downloads in
the measurement data. We label all the suspicious download events based on the
campaign IOCs. Consequently, we further discover 224 suspicious downloaders and
3,395 suspicious payloads.
Data release. We plan to release the ChainSmith system in the form of a Web
application at http://ioc-chainsmith.org. We set up a web crawler for collecting
articles each week. Then ChainSmith parses the articles and updates the database
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with new results. The website provides the entire data for download as well as a
search interface to access the data.
5.3 Security implications
5.3.1 Persuasion techniques
To entice users to download the payloads, attackers are creative in designing
persuasion methods. Email spam, compromised websites, and malvertising can be
used as the basic approaches to targeting large group of individuals. In addition, the
attacker can post deceptive advertisements to persuade users to click on malicious
link. By integrating human discovery from blog posts and the real-world download
data from WINE, we aim to study different persuasion strategies as well as their
impact on subsequent download behaviors.
We identify 59 campaign groups that are both reported by security analysts
and WINE. Then we manually label the campaign groups based on the platform
where the information is displayed and the trigger that initiated the download, e.g.
the message that lures users to click or exploit kit that exploits a machine directly.
As a result, we are able to label baiting techniques for 44 campaign groups.4
Table 5.5 shows the top campaign groups that drop the most high-risk binaries
in WINE. To study the timeline of campaign groups, we further define active time
4Some blog posts focus more on the payload and only report the fact where the payload is
dropped, without describing the download infrastructure. In this case, we are not able to collect
the baiting techniques.
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Table 5.5: Top 10 campaign groups that drop the most suspicious binaries. The
group name is identified from the information provided by the references. Active
time corresponds to the time span of suspicious downloads, and discovery time
corresponds to the date when the references are posted. hrd: high-risk download,
hrb: high-risk binaries.
Rank Name # of hrb. # of hrd. Active time Discovery time Persuasion technique
1 Pinball Corp 874 25,578 05/19/2010 - 10/06/2013 03/29/2011 Advertise missing codec.
2 InstallCore 281 502 03/19/2012 - 02/07/2014 06/24/2013 - 10/18/2013 Advertise missing codec.
3 YieldManager 167 29,756 10/06/2012 - 06/28/2014 12/20/2012 - 07/03/2013 Advertise Flash Player.
4 Somoto installer 137 4,703 04/16/2012 - 06/27/2014 05/15/2013 - 07/26/2013 Advertise missing codec.
5 EzDownloaderpro 29 119 07/06/2012 - 09/30/2013 10/22/2013 Download portal.
6 OpenCandy 18 497 07/29/2013 - 06/15/2014 05/02/2014 Download portal.
7 Clikug 16 450 11/20/2013 - 06/30/2014 12/04/2013- 02/13/2014 Advertise Skype credit generator.
8 Awimba LLC 14 144 05/28/2012 - 05/23/2013 06/19/2013 Flash update notification.
9 BubbleDock 10 58 08/08/2013 - 01/05/2014 11/11/2013 Advertise missing codec.
10 – 6 88 02/04/2013 - 10/27/2013 03/02/2013 Flash update notification.
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to be the time span when high-risk downloads are observed in measurement data,
and discovery time as the time period that the corresponding blogs are posted.
26 campaign groups start from social engineering, which is the most commonly
used technique in our data. Unlike drive-by downloads, social engineering does not
involve exploitation and intrusion, and malware delivery is initiated by user actions.
Table 5.5 shows that all the top campaign groups entice users simply through social
engineering, which suggests that social engineering is prevalent and effective.
To dig deeper into the social engineering methods, we group the high-risk
binary payloads according to the persuasion technique utilized, and we calculate the
daily rate of high-risk downloads produced by each technique. Figure 5.4 shows the
daily high-risk downloads for the top 10 baiting techniques. For a fair comparison
among the social engineering methods, we remove drive-by downloads that deliver
payloads directly using exploits. Figure 5.4a shows the total daily downloads of
high-risk binaries. Media player related advertisement involves providing deceptive
information that entices users to download something in order to watch an online
video. For example, group 1 in Table 5.5 provides a fake video, and asks users to
download the missing plug-in in order to play it. Most high-risk download events
occur in response to media player advertising. In fact, this ruse can be substantially
more persuasive than other techniques: groups 1 and 3 from Table 5.5 generate an
order of magnitude more downloads than other groups.
Figure 5.4b shows the daily downloads per file, for each persuasion technique,
which reflects the delivery ability from the perspective of customers. The most pro-
lific campaign group sends messages containing the download URL to the contacts
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of compromised Skype accounts. The effectiveness of this technique in distributing
high-risk files suggests that users are less alert to the message received from their
friends and colleagues. However, we do not observe a large volume of downloads
for these campaigns, which are limited by the number of compromised accounts.
Another effective baiting trick is to present a fake software update notification, and
the common target applications are Flash Player and IE. To enhance credibility,
the page hosting the supposed plug-in can even mimic the Flash Player installation
process; instead, a dropper is usually installed on the user’s machine. The least
attractive baiting content is anti-virus scanners. These anti-virus scanners are usu-
ally labeled as PUP (potentially unwanted program) since they do not behave as
they claimed and ask users to buy the license. The low rate of downloads suggests
that users are less susceptible to the rogue anti-virus advertisement, which is also
supported by prior work [97]. Interestingly, an application that warns about an im-
pending zombie invasion produces a higher download rate than the rogue anti-virus
scanners.
We do not include drive-by downloads in our analysis, as the total number
of downloads is too small to accurately estimate the influence and effectiveness of
the technique. This suggests that attackers likely change the domains used for
exploitation and intrusion frequently so that the IOCs collected from blog posts
cannot be used to capture the download behaviors. The binary download behaviors
from three exploit kits are recorded in WINE. However, the total number of high-
risk downloads is less than 10 for each of groups, which suggests that the domains




























































































































































































(b) Daily downloads per file.
Figure 5.4: Daily downloads of high-risk binaries. Total daily download (a) reflects
the frequency that a specific baiting technique is used in high-risk download; while
the average of individual file (b) reflects the effectiveness of binary delivery of a
single file.
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Table 5.5 shows the dates when campaigns from the top tier-1 groups were
active. This shows that these campaigns are long lasting, usually exceeding 1 year
in duration. Because the download event data-set was collected until June 2014,
we cannot track the full length of some campaigns persisting past that date. The
campaigns for half of the top tier-1 groups remain active at that date, suggesting
that the real duration may be significantly longer. These long durations suggest
that we currently lack the technical means to stop the delivery campaigns involved
in social engineering. Interestingly, for 7 out of the 10 campaigns, the articles
mentioning them are published well within the activity period of the campaigns,
suggesting that the campaigns go on after they are discovered by security analysts.
This suggests that the baiting techniques remain effective in luring users, and the
benefits of switching to another baiting technique do not outweigh the costs.
Implications. Comparing the effectiveness of the persuasion techniques employed
by malicious actors suggests areas where public awareness and education are most
likely to have an impact on malware delivery. In addition, the campaigns from tier-1
suppliers usually go on for at least 1 year—even after they have been discovered.
This reveals the limitations of existing security tools in preventing campaigns that
rely upon social engineering. Because most tier-1 suppliers employing social engi-
neering do not exhibiting any exploitation or intrusion intentions, and because the
downloaded payload may not expose obvious malicious behavior, it is difficult to
detect and determine whether to block such campaigns in the gray area.
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5.3.2 Underground business relationships
To study the business relationship between tier-1 suppliers and their cus-
tomers, we identify the ownership of payloads from the certificate and the anti-virus
signatures. If the payload is signed, which is often the case for PUPs, then we con-
sider the publisher in the certificate as the owner of the payload. If the payload is not
signed, then we identify the malware family using the AVclass tool [123]. As a result,
we identify 289 payload owners. The payload owners maintain a direct relationship
with tier-1 suppliers if the payload is dropped from the domains of tier-1 suppliers.
Otherwise, we consider the relationship as indirect if the binary is bundled by the
reseller without establishing direct relationship with tier-1 suppliers. 87.5% of pay-
load owners maintain a direct relationship with the tier-1 suppliers, which suggests
that the majority of downloads are directly associated with the baiting techniques.5
In addition, one actor might have different ways to deliver its payloads. For ex-
ample, Somoto better installer has its own advertising network [124], but it is also
delivered through OpenCandy in our data set.
Some business relationships might be hidden from the measurement data be-
cause the real creator of a binary may not be the parent process. For example,
if the application creates a service, then svchost.exe might be recorded as the
parent of any subsequent behaviors from the service. Therefore, the parent-child
5The actual percentage of direct should be higher, because the payload owner and tier-1 supplier
can be the same. In this case, the customer of the payload dropper also has a direct relationship
with tier-1 suppliers.
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relationship might be incomplete from the measurement data. However, blog posts
provide another complementary data source to bridge the missing relations because
security analysts are able to differentiate and report the real causal relationships.
By integrating the results from security articles, we are able to formulate hypotheses
about the business relationship between campaign groups. For example, tpstneuk-
nash[dot]com is reported as the C&C server for ZeroAccess, and it delivers Tro-
janSpy:Win32/Bafi.E in WINE. Therefore, it is likely that the victim of ZeroAccess
receives the command to download Win32/Bafi from tpstneuknash[dot]com. More-
over, such business relationship might be previously unknown, since Win32/Bafi
is absent from malware families that are dropped by ZeroAccess [125]. Moreover,
Symantec security response lists two malware families dropped by ZeroAccess, and
the payload malware we discovered is not on the list, which implies that the business
relationship might be previously unknown.
Implications. Although not all campaign groups have infrastructure for baiting,
most of the groups are the direct customer of tier-1 suppliers. In addition, the
tier-1 suppliers can also be the customer of another group. This suggests that the
business relationship is prevalent and the actors in the underground market can
be highly connected. Moreover, there might be more business relationships hidden
from measurement data due to the fact that it is hard to find the real parent of a
download event.
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5.3.3 Lifecycles of campaigns and infrastructures
As noted in Chapter 5.3.1, most of campaign groups use social engineering
for binary delivery. This suggests that most of the domains used in exploitation
and intrusion may change frequently, and consequently it is difficult to use IOCs
for detecting long-running campaigns. Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of IOC
occurrence in technical blogs for file hash, URL and IP address.6 Owing to malware
polymorphism and domain generating algorithms, most domains and malware will
not be identical during the same campaign and therefore security analysts are likely
to report different IOCs from the same campaign. In addition, IP addresses are
more likely to be discussed in different articles, because they are more difficult to
be changed than URLs and file hashes. This suggests that attackers are likely to
change the domains they used in order to evade detection, and therefore IOCs are
usually short-lived and may never be used again.
While their utility for real-time detection is limited, IOCs can be useful in
security forensics to identify long-term campaign groups. Domains can be changed
frequently, but the attackers are still likely to reuse part of the infrastructure, which
makes it possible to connect the dots and observe the long-term evolution of a cam-
paign. Figure 5.6 shows examples of spam campaigns related to the Cridex family
collected from 6 different articles. All the spam emails redirect users to the BlackHole
exploit kit, and drop one version of Cridex malware. The malware communicates
with different command and control servers, and the IP of the C&C server keeps




















Figure 5.5: Percentage of the IOC occurrence in technical blogs for file hash, URL
and IP address. The distribution of IOC occurrence is highly skewed, and therefore
we only show the percentage of the occurrence less than 3.
changing over time, which is likely because the server’s IP gets blacklisted. But
in some cases, the attacker reuses old C&C IPs. For example, as shown in Figure
5.6, attacker reused 210.56.23.100 on November 19 (4 months later), and reused
95.142.167.193 on November 26 (3 months later). One possible explanation for this
behavior is that IPs are removed from blacklists after several months so that the at-
tackers may add them back to the campaign infrastructure. Kührer et al. studied 15
blacklists from which they estimated the average blacklisting time [126]. Although
the average listing time varies for different blacklists, the malicious domain will be
delisted after 100 days on average. This suggests that attackers might actively check
if the domain and IP are removed from blacklist, and utilize the old delisted domain
and IP.
Implications. Our findings provide important lessons for the most effective uses of
threat intelligence. The premise of threat intelligence is that sharing the technical
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Figure 5.6: Spam campaigns that drop Worm:Win32/Cridex.E.
details of breaches and attacks makes everybody safer because it makes it harder
for attackers to reuse attack methods and artifacts, thus increasing their work fac-
tor [21]. Our results suggest that the detection of IOCs based on URLs and IPs is
not an effective mitigation, as the network identities of servers involved in malware
delivery campaigns already change frequently. While several domain generation al-
gorithms have been reverse engineered in prior work [102], future IP and domain
name changes within one campaign cannot, in general, be predicted based only on
the threat intelligence. Even though the URLs and IP addresses of malicious servers
are short-lived, campaigns using this infrastructure can be long-lasting and they may
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continue after some components are taken down. This suggests that the connections
established among IOCs and the qualitative insights about the campaigns are the
most useful outcomes of threat intelligence.
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Chapter 6: Discussion
6.1 Automatic feature engineering
The fundamental reason why we can extract salient malware features from
scientific papers is that researchers tend to show the useful features and ignore
those that do not work. Additionally, as the publication process focuses on novelty,
papers often show examples that are absent in prior work. This enables us to extract
features automatically by mining scientific papers. Moreover, the features that are
not related to malware are seldom mentioned in papers, which facilitates feature
mining process.
In some cases, the relationship between malware and features is not stated
explicitly. For example, researchers illustrate the behavior of malware without
mentioning any specific API calls; similarly, when analyzing the Android API, re-
searchers may list the calls that leak personal data without mentioning specific mal-
ware families. In these cases, the middle behavior nodes from our semantic network
help us link the malware to features. These nodes also allow us to discover more
related features from Android developer documents. These documents illustrate the
functionality of API calls, which reveals the relationships between behaviors and
features. This allows us to fill some gaps left in the research papers on Android
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malware.
A potential direction for further improving FeatureSmith is to combine the
behaviors with the same semantic meaning. One method is to manually create a
task-specific ontology, which would require an intensive annotation effort. An alter-
native solution is to utilize word embeddings, like our system in Chapter 5, which
allows us to determine whether two behaviors are identical. Another benefit from
embedding words or behaviors with the semantic meaning is constructing behavior
sequences. For example, we could identify features that represent the initial step in
a sequence of actions, such as the onClick feature that is usually the entry point of
the malicious activity.
FeatureSmith provides a general architecture for extracting informative fea-
tures from natural language, which could be adapted to other security topics. For
example, we could extract the features for iOS or Windows malware by using a
different set of concrete malware families and features. However, our feature engi-
neering process works under the assumption that a feature is be a named entity. If
the features are associated with some operations, such as “max”, “number of”, our
current implementation cannot identify these features automatically. Besides mal-
ware detection using function calls as features, network protocols is another area
where we can identify a large amount of named entities. For example, instead of
malware we could look at network attacks and instead of API calls we could utilize
various fields from protocol packets.
Since knowledge from scientific literature cannot cover every aspects of secu-
rity, we propose another data-driven feature engineering approach that learns im-
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portant features directly from data. The key difference between ReasonSmith and
the state-of-the-art technique for model explanation is that we model the feature
importance as a random variable, and the analysis is feature-oriented. In security
applications like malware detection, features usually have their own semantic mean-
ing. By identifying most important features, researchers can easily verify if the
features are indicators for new behaviors or artifacts learned from training data.
However, the state-of-the-art techniques are sample-oriented, which focus on inter-
preting individual features. The explanation only shows the local representation of
the system, and it is still unclear how the model works for the whole data set. In
addition, the sample-oriented technique is able to tell if a feature is important by
giving one example, but not able to tell if a feature is not important.
In this dissertation, we only test the case when local interpretation can be
modeled by single Gaussian distribution, which is a strong assumption. To better
estimate the distribution, we should evaluate the performance for Gaussian mixture
model, where k is greater than 1. Another approach is to use non-parametric es-
timation, for example, neural representation. The idea is similar to GAN, which
models the input distribution by a feed-forward generator [127]. The generator re-
turns a fake local interpretation and can be trained together with a discriminator
that tries to distinguish the real local interpretation and the generated one. Then
we can further apply Monte Carlo method to generator to estimate the probability
that interpretation w is non-zero.
We propose two different methods to engineer feature hypotheses for malware
detection from security literature and malware data set, which helps analysts to effi-
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ciently identify important features and data artifacts. However, in this dissertation,
we did not answer how to select features in practice. Because we show that data
artifacts are common in security in Chapter 4, it is difficult to develop some criteria
to select features automatically. Whether the features are meaningful to security an-
alysts should be a primary metric to evaluate the feature quality. As a future work,
we could study how security analysts think about the important features through a
user study, and further develop a framework for feature selection.
6.2 Malware delivery campaign
As social engineering is the prevalent strategy to start the delivery campaign,
human factors play an important role in the security arms race. The state-of-the-art
detection systems focus more on blocking network intrusion and removing malicious
programs, but they usually ignore whether the behaviors are consistent with what
is as expected. In many cases, especially for PUP delivery, the message provided in
the campaign is inconsistent with the behavior behind the scenes. This provides an
opportunity for stopping these campaigns by blocking the misleading advertisement,
regardless of whether the downloaded payload is malicious or not. For example, a
benign download should be blocked when it is bundled with a fake Flash update
notification. In this case, understanding the semantics of advertisement is the key
to preventing the deception.
In this dissertation, we compare the IOCs collected from blog posts to the
real-world measurement data. We show that threat intelligence is useful in secu-
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rity forensics, because it provides semantics to the measurement data and make it
possible for security researchers to explain the measurement data. However, measur-
ing the effectiveness of IOCs in detecting malicious campaigns is equally important
and has not been studied thoroughly. In fact, that few IOCs are shared in both
measurement data and security articles suggests that the infrastructure in the cam-
paign is likely to change frequently. Therefore, how to make the most use of threat
intelligence in real-time campaign detection should be an important next step.
Automatically extracting the semantics of security threats from natural lan-
guage documents is a promising direction for the analysis of long-lasting cam-
paigns. In particular, determining semantics of the relationships among indica-
tors of compromise is key to reconstructing chains of actions and distinguish dif-
ferent actors in the campaign. Prior techniques for extracting IOCs from tech-
nical documents [57, 128, 129] are unable to reconstruct campaigns automatically
(in [57], the authors established some links between a C&C infrastructure and the
exploits utilized through manual analysis). In contrast, ChainSmith automatically
reconstructs the semantics of entire delivery campaigns. One benefit of semantic
relationships is that they allow us to identify different actors in campaigns. To
stimulate further research on cyber threat intelligence, we released a Web appli-
cation (http://ioc-chainsmith.org) for providing data extracted automatically
from natural language reports in a timely manner.
123
Chapter 7: Conclusion
In this dissertation, we study automatic feature engineering for malware de-
tection using both qualitative data (e.g. scientific literature and security blogs) and
quantitative data (e.g. malware execution traces).
Knowledge-base feature engineering. In Chapter 3, we describe FeatureSmith
system that automatically engineers features for Android malware detection by min-
ing scientific papers. The system’s operation mirrors the human feature engineering
process and represents the knowledge described using a semantic network, which
captures the semantic similarity between abstract malware behaviors and concrete
features that can be tested experimentally. FeatureSmith incorporates novel text
mining techniques, which address challenges specific to the security literature. We
use FeatureSmith to characterize the evolution of our body of knowledge about
Android malware, over the course of four years. Compared to a state-of-the-art
feature set that was created manually, our automatically engineered features shows
no performance loss in detecting real-world Android malware, with 92.5% true pos-
itives and 1% false positives. In addition, FeatureSmith can single out informative
features that are overlooked in the manual feature engineering process, as human
researchers are unable to assimilate the entire body of published knowledge. We
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also propose a mechanism for utilizing our semantic network to generate feature ex-
planations, which link the features to human-understandable concepts that describe
malware behaviors. Our semantic network and the automatically generated features
are available at http://featuresmith.org.
Data-driven feature engineering. In Chapter 4, we describe ReasonSmith sys-
tem that evaluates the global importance of all features for deep neural network
based models. The system models feature importance as random variable that can
be estimated empirically from a given data set. We evaluate our system using both
Windows and Android data sets with more than 100k samples in each. By remov-
ing the features that are less important, the DNN-based malware detectors can still
have high true positive rate with low false positive rate, which shows that Reason-
Smith provides better feature score that captures the global influence. In addition,
we further distinguish data biases and artifacts by applying ReasonSmith to data
in different time spans. We find that many important features learned by neural
networks are artifacts that potentially degrade the performance of malware detector
in practice.
Feature engineering for malware campaigns. In Chapter 5, we describe Chain-
Smith, a system that automatically extracts IOCs from technical articles and in-
dustry reports, and classifies them into different campaign stages, i.e. baiting, ex-
ploitation, installation and command and control. This provides a semantic layer
on top of IOCs that captures the role of indicators in a malicious campaign. Chain-
Smith achieves 91.9% precision and 97.8% recall in extracting IOCs from natural
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language documents and is able to determine the campaign stage for 86.2% of IOCs
with 78.2% precision and 80.7% recall. In addition, we identify 8,902 campaign
groups from IOCs based on the stages and article post time. This makes it possi-
ble to combine threat intelligence with field-gathered data. The data is released at
http://ioc-chainsmith.org.
We use a data set of download events to measure the effectiveness of different
persuasion strategies employed in the baiting stage. We find that most campaigns
deliver payloads through social engineering, without exhibiting any intrusion inten-
tions. Media player advertising is most persuasive and generates the largest number
of high-risk downloads, but “friends recommendations” and fake update notifica-
tions are most effective, as they generate the most daily downloads per file. In
addition, we find that most of the customers in the malware delivery ecosystem
have direct relationships to the suppliers that operate baiting services. Finally, we
give use cases for leveraging IOCs in security forensics, which sheds new light on
the best uses of threat intelligence.
126
Bibliography
[1] Yajin Zhou and Xuxian Jiang. Dissecting android malware: Characterization
and evolution. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2012, 21-23
May 2012, San Francisco, California, USA, pages 95–109. IEEE Computer
Society, 2012.
[2] Yajin Zhou, Zhi Wang, Wu Zhou, and Xuxian Jiang. Hey, you, get off of my
market: Detecting malicious apps in official and alternative android markets.
In NDSS, 2012.
[3] Peder Olesen Larsen and Markus von Ins. The rate of growth in scientific
publication and the decline in coverage provided by science citation index.
Scientometrics, 84(3):575–603, 2010.
[4] Masayo Ota, Huy Vo, Claudio Silva, and Juliana Freire. A scalable approach
for data-driven taxi ride-sharing simulation. In Big Data (Big Data), 2015
IEEE International Conference on, pages 888–897. IEEE, 2015.
[5] DARPA. DARPA goes “Meta” with machine learning for machine learning.
http://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2016-06-17, 2016.
[6] McKinsey Global Institute. Game changers: Five opportunities for US growth
and renewal, Jul 2013.
[7] Daniel Arp, Michael Spreitzenbarth, Malte Hubner, Hugo Gascon, and Konrad
Rieck. Drebin: Effective and explainable detection of android malware in your
pocket. In NDSS, 2014.
[8] Richard P. Lippmann, David J. Fried, Isaac Graf, Joshua W. Haines, Kristo-
pher R. Kendall, David McClung, Dan Weber, Seth E. Webster, Dan
Wyschogrod, Robert K. Cunningham, and Marc A. Zissman. Evaluating in-
trusion detection systems: The 1998 DARPA off-line intrusion detection eval-
uation. DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition,, pages
12–26, 2000.
127
[9] John McHugh. Testing intrusion detection systems: a critique of the 1998 and
1999 darpa intrusion detection system evaluations as performed by lincoln
laboratory. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., 3(4):262–294, 2000.
[10] Matthew V Mahoney and Philip K Chan. Phad: Packet header anomaly
detection for identifying hostile network traffic. Technical report, 2001.
[11] Matthew V Mahoney and Philip K Chan. An analysis of the 1999
darpa/lincoln laboratory evaluation data for network anomaly detection. In
International Workshop on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, pages
220–237. Springer, 2003.
[12] Kathrin Grosse, Nicolas Papernot, Praveen Manoharan, Michael Backes, and
Patrick McDaniel. Adversarial perturbations against deep neural networks for
malware classification. arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.04435, 2016.
[13] George E Dahl, Jack W Stokes, Li Deng, and Dong Yu. Large-scale malware
classification using random projections and neural networks. In 2013 IEEE
International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, pages
3422–3426. IEEE, 2013.
[14] Meenu Ganesh, Priyanka Pednekar, Pooja Prabhuswamy, Divyashri Sreed-
haran Nair, Younghee Park, and Hyeran Jeon. Cnn-based android malware
detection. In 2017 International Conference on Software Security and Assur-
ance (ICSSA), pages 60–65. IEEE, 2017.
[15] Shun Tobiyama, Yukiko Yamaguchi, Hajime Shimada, Tomonori Ikuse, and
Takeshi Yagi. Malware detection with deep neural network using process
behavior. In 2016 IEEE 40th Annual Computer Software and Applications
Conference (COMPSAC), volume 2, pages 577–582. IEEE, 2016.
[16] Ke Xu, Yingjiu Li, Robert H Deng, and Kai Chen. Deeprefiner: Multi-layer
android malware detection system applying deep neural networks. In 2018
IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P), pages 473–
487. IEEE, 2018.
[17] Ben Athiwaratkun and Jack W Stokes. Malware classification with lstm and
gru language models and a character-level cnn. In 2017 IEEE International
Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), pages 2482–
2486. IEEE, 2017.
[18] Wenbo Guo, Dongliang Mu, Jun Xu, Purui Su, Gang Wang, and Xinyu Xing.
Lemna: Explaining deep learning based security applications. In Proceedings
of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pages 364–379. ACM, 2018.
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